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INTRODUCTION
Farm programs in the United States have become much more costly in 
recent years owing in part to the decline in exports, Since the early 
1980s, large public inventories of basic agricultural commodities have been 
accumulated under price support programs. In an attempt to reduce the 
accumulation of stocks and make the United States more competitive in world 
markets, lower support prices (loan rates) were implemented under the 1985 
Food Security Act. Various forms of export subsidies were introduced in 
the early 1980s in an attempt to reduce the level of public stocks.
An important determinant of the success of these measures is how U.S. 
exports are affected by lower prices; in other words, how consumption 
changes in importing countries, and how production responds in the princi­
pal competing exporters. Since the impact of price changes on production 
and consumption in most countries is influenced by the trade and domestic 
agricultural policies pursued by governments or their agencies, a key issue 
is how competing exporters respond to lower U.S. and world prices,
The obj ective of this study is to identify the factors which influ­
ence exports of one commodity, wheat, from one major competing exporter, 
Canada, and to use this information to draw inferences about how U.S. wheat 
exports might respond to lower U.S. wheat prices. Because the Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB) plays a major role in determining Canadian response to 
U.S. policy initiatives, the study focuses primarily on the behavior of the 
CWB.
1.0. THE CANADIAN GRAIN SECTOR
Since World War II, Canada has typically been the second leading 
world exporter of wheat, after the United States, More recently its posi­
tion has been challenged by growing exports from the European Community 
(EC). Canada's market share gradually deteriorated during the 1970s; how­
ever , the volume of Canadian exports increased substantially -- from around 
10 million metric tons (mmt) per year in the 1960s to between 17 and 21 mint 
in the early 1980s. Exports from other countries grew even more rapidly, 
causing Canada's share to fall. In the mid-1980s, Canada's share of world 
wheat exports has averaged between 18 and 20 percent.
1.1. Production and Marketing
Wheat production in Canada, roughly 95 percent of which is derived 
from the Prairie Provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), rose from 
19.7 mmt in 1963 to 26.6 mmt in 1983; a gain of 35 percent. But there was 
considerable variation from year to year. Production reached 22.5 mmt as 
early as 1966, but plummeted to 9 mmt in 1970 under an acreage reduction 
program (Lower Inventories for Tomorrow, or LIFT). Much of the variation 
in production, with the notable exception of 1970, can be attributed to 
variable yields, which ranged from 1.36 mt/ha in 1964 to 2.1 mt/ha in 1976 
and 1982 (CGC, 1986). The coefficient of variation for wheat yields in 
western Canada is almost twice that of the United States (Spriggs). Wheat 
area, on the other hand, hovered around 11 million hectares during the
21960s, then dropped to 5 million in 1970 with the LIFT program. Since 
1970, wheat area has been increasing; it reached a peak of 13.7 million 
hectares in 1983 (Figure 1.1).
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) has exclusive authority to purchase 
wheat, barley, and oats of export quality produced in the Prairie 
Provinces. Since the early 1970s, the CWB has announced prior to spring 
planting the initial payment it will make to farmers upon delivery of grain 
to local elevators. Operators of these elevators serve as agents of the 
CWB. When all the grain received in a given- marketing year has been sold 
by the CWB (up to 18 months after harvest) , revenues are pooled and all 
farmers receive equal final payments, adjusted for grade differences and 
transport costs. In some years there are interim payments if demand is 
stronger than.'.anticipated (Schmitz and McCalla).
The CWB operates a delivery quota system to obtain the supplies 
needed to meet export commitments and to encourage uniform delivery of 
grain by farmers throughout the year. As quotas are announced, farmers 
have the opportunity to deliver a certain amount of grain based on their 
declared acreage. Previous delivery opportunities expire when a new quota 
is announced, and producers who do not use their quotas increase the risk 
that they will later be unable to deliver all of their grain. Neverthe­
less, deliveries to the CWB peak in July and August, just before and at the 
beginning of the new- harvest. In years of large production, the CWB may 
actually restrict total deliveries if the nation's rail and port facilities 
are inadequate to move the grain or if there is insufficient demand in the 
world market.
In addition to- delivery to CWB terminals, farmers have the option to 
sell their feed-quality grains on the open (or "offboard") market. Before 
1973, these sales were restricted to the province of production, but begin­
ning in 1974 the federal government allowed interprovincial trade in feed 
grains (Spriggs). However, all milling wheat, milling oats, and malting 
barley (i. e. , all export grades) must be delivered to the CWB (C. Wilson) . 
Producers tend to deliver most of their feed grade wheat to the CWB as 
well. Thus, the vast majority (97 percent in 1976/77) of Canadian wheat is 
handled by the Board <C. Wilson).
When quotas are not restrictive, i.e., when farmers are allowed to 
deliver as much grain to the CWB as they would like, the offboard price 
should equal the best estimate of final returns from the wheat pool for 
feed grade wheat. When quotas are restrictive, offboard prices should be 
depressed below expected returns from the CWB (Spriggs). Through the quota 
system the CWB manages flows to the export market and can force farmers to 
hold substantial inventories , which may lead to reduced acreage in future 
years.
A further aspect of policy affecting wheat production is the Western 
Grain Stabilization Program (WGSP), which provides cash flow protection to 
producers of wheat, barley, and other prairie crops. If prices or produc- 
tion decline enough to cause net cash returns to fall below the previous 
five-year average, a payment is made from the stabilization fund equal to 
the net cash shortfall. Such payments continue as long as net cash returns 
are below the average of the previous five years (Normile, 1986.).
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4Payments are made on the basis of sector-wide performance and, hence, the 
program offers no protection against localised■drought or poor management. 
There is also no explicit attempt to account for inflation. Payments per 
participant are determined by an individual's contributions to the stabi­
lization fund in previous years.
Participation in the WGSP is voluntary for producers, who annually 
pay into the fund between 1 and 2,5 percent of their receipts (up to 
receipts of $60,000). lhe federal government matches the contributions 2 
for 1 and pays administrative costs. About 75 percent of eligible produc­
ers participate (CGG, 1986), The WGSP made payouts in 1977 and 1978' which 
averaged C$896 and C$1,843 per recipient, respectively. In 1982 and 1983, 
falling farm income failed, to trigger a payout, and the program came under 
criticism. As a result, the trigger mechanism was amended to protect cash 
flow per ton (net cash flow divided by volume of grain marketed) as well as 
total net cash flow. The program period was also changed from a calendar 
to a crop year basis. These changes resulted in estimated payments in 
1983/84 and 1984/85 of C$1,800 and C$3,/00 per recipient, respectively 
(Normile, 1986).
1.2. Domestic Consumption
txcep l. for the small amount of feed wheat traded on the of fboard mar - 
ket, all wheat purchases for use in Canada are made through the CWB. Until 
1979, the CWB set the price to domestic users independently of market 
forces, and the price changed only once between 1969 and 1979. Since 1979 
the milling price has been the CWB export price, if the latter is between 
C$5,00 and C$7.00 per bushel. If the export price moves outside of this 
range, the CWB sells to processors at the boundary price (Spriggs).
In July 1976, the CWB agreed to sell feed grains at prices competi­
tive with U.S. corn. Thus, the CWB provided a price ceiling for western 
feed grains supplied by the of fboard market, So long as the offboard price 
stayed below the CWB corn-competitive prices, the market would be supplied 
by the offboard market. If the offboard price moved above the CWB price, 
the CWB became a seller in the domestic feed-grains market (Spriggs).
Wiese arrangements had the potential to influence world markets for 
wheat and feed grains by diverting grain from the export to domestic mar­
kets when prices reached their upper boundaries. Corn-competitive sales of 
feed grains were suspended from August 1, 1985, but the upper and lower 
boundaries for the domestic milling price of wheat remain in effect. Dur­
ing most of the period of operation of the scheme, CWB official export 
prices remained between the milling price boundaries, and exports were 
unaffected.
Consumption of wheat for food and industrial uses rose from 1.6 mint 
in 1963/64 to 2.0 in 1983/84, with year-to-year variations not exceeding 8 
percent (Figure 1.2). ■ The use of wheat for feed has shown both more growth 
and greater variability during the same period; total use rose from 1.5 mint 
in 1963/64 to 2.3 mint in 1983/84, with annual changes of up to 30 percent. 
The use of seed wheat has varied roughly with wheat area, but has shown
5So
ur
ce
: 
Ca
na
da
 G
ra
in
s 
Cou
nci
l
6little overall growth. Usage was 1.1 mint in 1963/64, 0.5 mint in 1969/70, 
and 1.2 nrait in 1983/84 (CGC, 1986).
1.3. Exports
As noted above, the GWB is the sole agent for exports of Canadian 
grain. The CWB announces its export prices frequently, but actual prices 
and other delivery terms are negotiable. In addition to the regular promo­
tion of single sales to any buyer, the CWB negotiates bilateral agreements 
for minimum annual deliveries over longer periods. Agreements generally 
cover three to five years. Both the volume and the share of Canadian grain 
exported under bilateral agreements have varied over the past twenty years, 
reaching 11 mmt (78 percent) in 1966, falling to less than 1 mint during the 
pre-1973 glut, increasing to 14.5 mmt (68 percent) In 1982 and 13.5 mmt (75 
percent) in 1985 (IWC). Total exports have also varied considerably. 
Canada exported 16.2 mmt of wheat in 1963/64, 8.3 mmt in 1968/69, and 21.8 
mmt of wheat in 1983/84 (Figure 1.1).
1.4 Storage
Stocks are held by farmers, processors, and by the CWB, Farmers
often hold grain until June or July when they have a better idea of the 
current year's crop and the following year’s prices before delivering to 
the CWB (Normile, 1983). They also need to deliver before August 1 to be 
included in the preceding year's CWB payment pool. On-farm stocks of wheat 
have usually been in the 2-4 mmt range over the past twenty years; however, 
they have ranged from a low of 1.6 mmt in 1974/75 to a high of 14.8 mmt in 
1969/70. Nonfarm stocks (primarily held by the CWB) were usually 9 to 11 
mmt during the 1960s, but rose to a peak of 13.1 mmt in 1968/69. Since 
1972, ending stocks have averaged between 6 and 8 mmt (Normile, 1983) .
Officials at the CWB indicated In 1986 that the desired minimum year-end 
carryover (July 31) was around 7 mmt to ensure a steady flow of exports.
72.0. OBJECTIVES AND MARKETING STRATEGIES OF THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD
Given the importance of the Canadian Wheat Board in exporting 
Canada's wheat, it is necessary to understand the export behavior of the 
Board. The first step in understanding export behavior is to identify the 
Board's obj ectives.
2 *1 • .Stated_^blec^ives^fljthe _Canadjan Wheat Board
The Canadian Wheat Board Act of 1935 created the CWB and continues, 
as amended, to define the Board's objectives and powers. In the Act, the 
object of the CWB is stated broadly as follows: "The Board is incorporated 
with the object of marketing in an orderly manner, in interprovincial and 
export trade, grain grown in Canada. . ." (C. Wilson, p. 64). The state’d 
selling policy is equally open-ended. "The Board shall sell and dispose of 
grain acquired by it ... for such prices as it considers reasonable with 
the obj ect of promoting the sale of grain produced in Canada in world 
markets" (C. Wilson, p . 65).
The CWB has interpreted its mandate somewhat more specifically as 
follows: "(1) To market as much grain as possible at the best price that 
can be obtained; (2) To provide prairie grain producers with price sta­
bility; (3) To ensure that each grain producer gets his fair share of the 
available markets each year." (quoted in McCalla and Schmitz, p. 204). 
These obj ectives are not necessarily mutually consistent, and may not be 
given equal weight. It is necessary to examine the behavior of the Board 
to determine its principal objectives and strategies.
The history of the Wheat Board since the late 1960s does not suggest 
that is has attempted to control supply. Although the CWB apparently did 
withhold supplies from the market during the 1950s and early 1960s in an 
attempt to raise prices (McCalla; Menzies et al. ; Oleson), this strategy 
resulted in reduced sales and Increased stocks, necessitating the unpopular 
LIFT (acreage reduction) program of 1970. The Board came under substantial 
criticism for having accumulated large stocks, and a CWB study concluded 
that the Board should concentrate on selling grain and keep stocks to a 
minimum (Menzies et al.). In the early 1980s, producers opposed supply 
restrictions because of cash flow problems and lingering resentment over 
restrictions on deliveries in the 1970s.
In response to these events, the CWB now views Itself primarily as a 
marketing agency for producers. This is reflected in a personal statement 
made by the Chief Commissioner of the CWB that the Board's objective is to 
sell grain and pass price signals along to farmers, keeping stocks as low 
as possible. Another CWB official said that the Board would always allow 
farmers to deliver grain If the Board could sell it, and added that the 
Board makes no attempt to influence farmers' production decisions (CWB, 
1986a).
Finally, the constraints which the Board may face because of price 
stabilization and equity considerations have been reduced by changes in 
institutional arrangements. The Western Grain Stabilization Program, 
described earlier, was established specifically to allow the Wheat Board to
8price competitively in the world market with less concern about stabilizing 
producers' incomes (Oleson).
The Board's delivery quota system is designed to guarantee equitable 
access to markets for all producers. Changes in this system indicate how 
the operating philosophy of the CWB has evolved (C. Wilson,) . A study for 
the Board in 1971 concluded that "the primary function of the quota system 
should be to secure the delivery of the grains and oilseeds required to 
fill sales contracts and provide reasonable stocks against anticipated 
sales'. . . . Equalization of quotas among farmers is a desirable objective 
but should not be achieved at the expense of marketing efficiency” (Menzies 
et al., p. 26).
The resulting changes in the quota system apparently improved the 
efficiency of the marketing system. As one observer noted, "Because a 
lower priority was placed on equitable delivery opportunities, the Board 
achieved a significantly larger export volume in 1970/71 than had been 
accomplished in the previous crop year" (C. Wilson, p . 242). The equity 
objective was not discarded, however, as producers still cite the fairness 
of the delivery quota system as one of the main virtues of the CWB (Harder; 
Penner; and Wild).
Since the report of Menzies et al. in 1971, the Wheat Board's 
declared objectives have been to maximize returns from each crop that farm­
ers produce without trying to manage supply, and to keep stocks to a 
minimum.
2.2. Theoretical Implications for CWB Behavior
Economic theory implies that the Wheat Board should follow certain 
strategies to achieve its stated objectives. Simple linear supply and 
demand curves can be used to describe how the CWB can be expected to 
respond to different marketing situations, specifically the problems of 
variable domestic production and variable foreign demand. Nonlinear demand 
curves will be introduced subsequently to reflect more accurately the 
actual conditions in the world wheat market.
Figure 2.1 depicts a simplified model of the situations that the CWB 
might face in selling its wheat crop. DQ represents normal (or average) 
excess demand for Canadian wheat, and qQ is the average level of Canadian 
exportable surplus.1 The output at which marginal revenue is zero is 
represented by qm . At that point, which is the midpoint of the linear 
demand schedule, the excess demand elasticity equals -1.0. If exportable 
surplus is less than qm , total revenues will be maximized by selling the 
entire supply. It will be argued below that Canada's average exportable 
surplus, qQ , has been less than qffi since 1973.
The excess demand facing Canada is the difference between world demand 
and world supply, excluding Canada's demand and supply. Canadian ex­
portable surplus is defined as the difference between Canada's production 
and consumption in a given year.
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Figure 2.1. Variable Canadian product ion and variable demand 
for Canadian wheat exports
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If ^ in a given year exportable surplus is greater than q , for exam­
ple, q2 in Figure 2.1(a), and the Board exports this entire supply at price 
P2, it will receive less revenue than if it sells only q because it is 
operating on the inelastic segment of the demand curve. A superior strate­
gy for the disposal of supplies greater than qm may be to store the excess 
(e.g., q2-qm) and sell it in another year when exportable surplus is less 
than qm . To implement this strategy, the Wheat Board needs to know what 
constitutes average production (at least approximately) so that grain is 
stored only when exportable surplus is greater than average. If the Board 
underestimates average production, it will accumulate stocks because there 
will be insufficient "short'* years to dispose of the excess. Conversely, 
if average production is overestimated stocks will be depleted and the CWB 
may find itself unable to supply its regular customers.
The Wheat Board faces similar problems as a result of variable excess 
demand for Canadian exports, and the Board can respond in similar ways. 
The world demand for wheat and the demand facing Canada vary from year to 
year mostly due to variable production in importing countries and in com­
peting exporters. This situation is shown in Figure 2.1(b), where D and 
qQ are again average foreign demand and average exportable surplus. Paral­
lel shifts in the demand curve are shown as and D2.
Even if Canadian supplies were stable, variable demand might make it 
profitable for the CWB to store wheat from one year to the next. For 
instance, if foreign demand shifts from DQ to , the CWB will find itself 
facing inelastic demand if it tries to sell the entire exportable surplus. 
On the other hand, if demand is strong and shifts out to Do, the CWB can 
seU as much as q3 at price P3 before it faces inelastic demand. Assuming 
that the CWB has reasonable knowledge of what constitutes "average" demand 
conditions, its optimal strategy for maximizing returns under weak demand 
is to store some grain for sale during a year of strong demand or low 
production.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that production and 
foreign demand may vary at the same time. The effects may negate each 
other (strong demand may coincide with high production) or reinforce each 
other (weak demand may coincide with high production), but the principles 
remain the same. As long as the Board correctly estimates average produc- 
tion and average demand, and the approximate price at which demand becomes 
inelastic, it can increase returns to producers by storing wheat in years 
of weak demand and/or above-average supplies and selling stocks in years of 
strong demand and/or below-average exportable surplus.
A major question that arises is what strategy the CWB would follow if 
either production or foreign demand were to shift such that average produc- 
tion, qQ , exceeded qm in a normal year. In this situation, the Board could 
maximize the returns for any particular crop by selling no more than q 
In the interest of producers, the Board would have to restrict deliveries 
of wheat to this level. The CWB's stated objectives, however, suggest that 
the Board would not follow such a strategy. When questioned on this point, 
Board officials indicated that they would sell all the grain and let farm­
ers decide if returns justified continued production of wheat. Even if 
this is the case, however, the optimal long-run strategy of the Board will
11
be to use variations in stocks to absorb short-term variations in domestic 
production and export demand.
If the CWB Is trying to maximize returns from a given crop of wheat, 
it might adopt a strategy which includes price discrimination across mar­
kets, If demand for Canadian wheat is inelastic in certain markets, the 
CWB could sell less and charge higher prices in these markets, while sell­
ing larger volumes of grain at a lower price to buyers whose demand is more 
elastic,. This would be possible only if the CWB could effectively 
separate the markets so that wheat could not be trans-shipped between 
importing countries. The success of price discrimination also depends upon 
the absence of close substitutes for Canadian wheat. Since Canada controls 
a relatively large percentage of high-protein wheat, it might be feasible 
for the CWB to identify and extract economic rent from inelastic markets 
for this type of wheat.
However, even if the CWB set its higher price just below the U . S, 
loan rate to avoid competition from U.S. supplies of high-protein wheat, it 
is unlikely that the CWB could maintain a system of price discrimination, 
given the potential competition from other suppliers such as Australia, 
If, for instance, the CWB offered to sell wheat to Japan (with price 
inelastic demand) at a high price and South Korea (with price elastic 
demand) at a lower price for high-protein wheat, Australia could divert 
supplies from South Korea to Japan and effectively negate Canada's attempt 
at price discrimination.
Price discrimination might be possible because of the inflexibility 
in trading patterns introduced through long-term agreements (LTAs) between 
the CWB and importing countries. If the terms of an LTA effectively 
require the importer to buy a minimum amount from Canada, then the effec­
tive elasticity of substitution between Australian and Canadian wheat is 
low (at least at or near the agreed minimum) and Canada would be in a posi­
tion to extract rent from a LTA customer. Japan has for the past ten years 
had LTAs with Canada that call for trade of 1.3 mmt of wheat per year, and 
each year Japan has purchased only slightly more than this amount, The 
USSR and China have each had LTAs with Canada during the past decade. 
These countries occas ionally purchased no more than the minimum quantities 
for a few years in succession.
Unfortunately, the evidence Is too sparse to establish any relation­
ship between LTAs and price discrimination, especially because there are 
other plausible explanations for minimum purchases. Besides, the degree of 
obligation involved in these agreements is questionable, since both minimum 
and maximum quantities are frequently abrogated. Therefore, it seems 
doubtful that Canada could successfully use LTAs as a mechanism for price 
discrimination.
2 Political relationships between countries can also lower the elasticity 
of substitution between wheat from different suppliers and provide oppor­
tunities for price discrimination. Again, however, such discrimination, if 
it exists, is difficult to document.
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2..3. Recent.. Behaylor of the Canadianjgheat. Board
In this section the recent behavior of the Canadian Wheat Board is 
examined to determine its consistency with its stated objectives and the 
predictions of economic theory,
Relationships with Other Exporters
There has been considerable speculation about actual collaboration in 
the past between wheat exporters and the potential for future collabora­
tion. However, collusive arrangements to restrict exports in order to 
raise prices would be inconsistent with the Canadian Wheat Board's current 
stated objectives listed above. Although it has been argued (e.g., by 
McCalla) that exporters colluded to maintain prices in the 1960s and early 
1970s, there is little evidence that tacit collusion or joint action has 
occurred since. Since the early 1970s, Argentina and the EEC have both 
become, significant exporters of wheat (with about 6 percent and 15 percent 
of world exports, respectively). Both of these countries have export poli­
cies that are driven by considerations other than the extraction of 
economic rent from importing countries. EEC export behavior is determined 
by the need to dispose of surplus production. Argentina has used wheat 
exports as a major source of government tax revenue. Though the other 
three major exporters (the United States, Canada, and Australia) still have 
about 75 percent of the market, the experience of OPEC in the mid-1980s 
demonstrates that unless supply in the rest of the world is extremely 
inelastic, a cartel may have difficulty enforcing its price.
If collusion existed among exporters, one would expect market shares 
to be reasonably stable. In fact, such shares have been highly variable in 
recent years. Canada's market share ranged between 17 percent and 22 per­
cent from 1975 to 1985, while Australia's market share varied between 9 
percent and 17 percent over the same period. The U. S. share was fairly 
stable, around 45 percent during the late 1970s, but rose to 49 percent in 
1981/82 and then dropped to 40 percent for each of the next three years. 
In 1985/86 the U.S, share dropped even further to just under 30 percent of 
world exports. While the United States accumulated stocks and limited sup­
ply through acreage reduction programs in the early 1980s, Canada and 
Australia were producing record amounts of wheat. This does not suggest 
that exporters were colluding.
Price-cutting has been severe in recent years. Since 1982, the 
United States has allocated a large amount of funds to "export enhancement 
programs" for wheat. These programs provide low-interest credit and other 
forms of direct and indirect subsidies to importers, the objective of which 
is to make American wheat more competitive with that of Argentina and espe­
cially the EEC (Petit). The U.S. Food Security Act of 1985 continues and 
expands these-programs, with over $5 billion per year available for credit 
guarantees and roughly $1 billion per year in cash and CCC commodities pro­
vided to exporters to offset "unfair trade practices" or to "develop, main­
tain, or expand” U. S. markets (Stucker and Collins). Major portions of 
this export assistance are being devoted to wheat.
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Given these facts, it is extremely implausible that the U . S. and 
Canada, let alone Australia, have been colluding through their export poli­
cies. U.S. acreage reductions and stock accumulations have helped to sup- 
port world prices, with the U.S, taxpayer bearing the burden of support 
alone. The reduction of loan rates under the 1985 Agricultural Act was 
partly intended to bring pressure on Canadian and Australian producers and 
the European Community to reduce production and exports.
Management of Carryover Stocks
Since the report of Menzies et al. in 1971, it has been the CWB's 
policy to sell most of what is produced each year and to minimize carry­
over. One would, therefore, expect carryover stocks to be limited to work­
ing stocks and have little year-to-year variation. Prior to the 1972/73 
crop year, the CWB had been willing to accumulate stocks to help support 
world prices. This led to large inventories in 1968 and 1969, which ulti­
mately resulted in a reduction in wheat production under the LIFT program 
in 1970.
Annual carryover stocks and their ratio to production are shown in 
Figure 2.2. Since 1971/72, aggregate (commercial plus on-farm) stocks have 
been substantially lower than they were in the late 1960s, both in absolute 
volume and in relation to production. This appears to be consistent with 
the Board's stated objective of minimizing stocks. Between 1976 and 1979, 
the Board was compelled to limit deliveries from farmers due to transporta­
tion and handling constraints. This led to the accumulation of on-farm 
stocks. Since then, stocks and their ratio to production have declined.
Use of Delivery Quotas
It seems clear there has been no collusion among exporters in the 
world wheat market since at least the late 1960s, but it remains to be seen 
whether the CWB accepts unlimited deliveries of wheat and simply exports it 
at the best price that can be obtained. The crucial question is whether 
the Wheat Board is in any way restricting Canadian wheat production, 
because any restriction would cast doubt upon whether the Wheat Board is 
really pursuing its stated objectives.
Despite recent record Canadian wheat production and exports, there is 
evidence that CWB delivery quotas have been restrictive at times. There is 
general agreement, for instance, that transportation and handling con­
straints during the late 1970s forced the CWB to use its delivery quota 
system to ration available facilities among producers (Normile, 1983; 
Hildebrand)»
More recently, however, the CWB and the Canadian government have 
undertaken an ambitious program to upgrade rail and port facilities, 
including a $90 million purchase by the CWB of 2000 railway hopper cars to 
help alleviate bottlenecks (Normile, 1983; USDA; CWB, 1981). This suggests 
that the Board has not used transportation constraints as an excuse to 
restrict production. As a result of recent improvements in transport and 
port facilities, combined with the decline in energy prices and decreased
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demand for facilities from the energy sector, the transportation and 
handling system is no longer a constraint for the CWB and grain producers 
(CWB, 1986a).
In an interview conducted during 1986, an official of the CWB did say 
that restrictive quotas had been applied to Canada Utility, a minor class 
of wheat, to signal producers to grow less because the market could not 
absorb available supplies at acceptable prices. Eventually producers 
reduced the area planted to this grade from 0.7 to 0.25 million hectares. 
Instead of lowering producer prices in order to reduce production, restrie- 
tive quotas were used because the Board did not want to be accused of dis­
rupting the world market (CWB, 1986a).
Delivery quotas have recently restricted delivery of certain types of 
grain from certain locations in certain years. In 1984/85 there was an 
abundance of high-quality wheat and the CWB restricted deliveries of this 
grade. During 1985/86 there were surpluses of low-quality wheat, and 
delivery of lower grades was restricted. This implies that the CWB has 
used delivery restrictions to maintain prices in some cases.
Three Canadian farmers from different areas were interviewed about 
the delivery quota system. Two stated that the restrictiveness of quotas 
is difficult to predict and generally does not Influence their planting 
decisions. A third farmer stated that delivery of the lower grades (CWRS 
No. 3 and Canada Feed) is often restricted and that he analyzes Board pro- 
j ections of sales and quotas before deciding how much wheat to plant 
(Harder, Penner; and Wild). All three farmers agreed that producers can 
deliver all of their top grades of wheat to the Board, if not during the 
current year then the year after, and that the delivery quota system is 
fair in that it guarantees equivalent delivery opportunities to both small 
and large farmers.
'pie Board may be reluctant to declare quotas open at the end of the 
marketing year because that would diminish its ability to persuade produc- 
ers to deliver in winter months when it is less convenient to do so (A. 
Wilson; Weaver)„ Still, a Board official Involved in implementing the 
quota system insisted the CWB would not restrict deliveries, even for a 
small group of producers, provided the Board felt it could sell the grain. 
The Board does prefer high quotas to open quotas at the end of the year in 
order to have n controlled” deliveries, but this does not take preference 
over allowing producers to deliver grain if the Board can sell it (CWB, 
1986a). Whatever the full explanation, the extent to which lower grades 
are consistently restricted appears minimal. Criticisms by farmers on this 
point are probably due more to the manner in which total quota acres are 
determined rather than to overall supply restrictions.
In announcing a new variety for unrestricted production in 1986, the 
Board said that it would nendeavor to market all wheats grown by producers, 
and that the relative merits of HY320 or any other variety will have to be 
determined by the marketplace. . . . the future of the variety will now be 
decided by the producers themselves, based on whether they are satisfied 
with the price and volume the marketplace can provide" (CWB, 1986b).
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Occasional delivery quota restrictions seem to arise because the 
Wheat Board cannot easily dispose of short-run surpluses of a particular 
grade of wheat. This suggests that the short-run elasticity of substitu­
tion between different wheat grades may not be high and/or the elasticity 
of substitution between the wheat of different exporters may be low.
In short, the use of quotas instead of prices to enforce sustained 
acreage reduction appears to have been limited primarily to a fairly minor 
grade of wheat with clearly inelastic demand.
Licensing of New Varieties
For at least ten years, the Canadian wheat industry has debated the 
licensing in Canada of so-called "American" varieties. These are high- 
yielding, mostly semi-dwarf wheats that are commonly grown in the United 
States. They typically yield 30 percent more grain than the standard Cana­
dian variety, but are also lower in quality. The CWB has long maintained 
that export of these varieties would undermine Canada's reputation as sup­
plier of the best wheat in the world and consequently reduce the premium 
that its top grades command (Mants et al.).
Supporters of the new varieties (sometimes called 3M varieties, for 
medium protein, medium hardness, and medium baking strength) have countered 
that the higher yields and higher export volumes would more than compensate 
for any price premium lost because of lower quality. They have argued that 
utilization of the varieties is growing faster than for high-quality wheat, 
and that Canada must supply 3M wheat if it is to maintain its share of a 
growing market (Mants et al.; CGC, n.d.). The Wheat Board has been accused 
of being overly preoccupied with high-quality wheat when the market growth 
potential is for "fair average quality" wheat (Lancashire). Producers and 
academics have called for the licensing of 3M varieties (Winnipeg Free 
Press, 1985a and 1985b).
In response to these criticisms, the CWB has argued that "we should 
maintain our markets for high-quality wheat. The countries that buy it 
(Europe and Japan) are consistent, cash customers" (Lancashire). It has 
not been suggested that Canada drop its top grades entirely, but the prob­
lem has been complicated by the visual indistinguishability of some of the 
best 3M varieties from premium Canadian varieties. Since the Canadian 
grading system relies on visual distinctions, the CWB and the Canadian 
Grain Commission have resisted the introduction of 3M varieties, on the 
grounds that these would inevitably be mixed with CWRS Nos. 1 and 2 and 
thereby ruin Canada's reputation for quality (Mants et al.).
Varietal tests for yields and quality were conducted over a number of 
years, with limited amounts being contracted for delivery to the Wheat 
Board. Finally, the CWB and the Grain Commission bowed to producer pres­
sure and established a new class of wheat, Canada Prairie Northern, for a 
3M variety known as HY320. This variety was made available for planting on 
an unrestricted basis for the first time in 1986, subject to delivery 
quotas. While it is not the best available variety in terms of yield and 
baking qualities, it is visually distinguishable from other Canadian varie­
ties (CGC, n.d.).
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Why did the CWB and the Grain Commission resist the new varieties for 
so long? In addition to the reasons given above, there are indications 
that the Board is reluctant to market large quantities of wheat which would 
compete directly with standard varieties of the United States (Dark North­
ern Spring and Hard Winter Ordinary) and Australia (Standard White). Cur­
rently , Canada's reputation for quality constitutes a degree of product 
differentiation that provides price separation from its competitors, even 
though the extent of this separation is probably limited. Large exports of 
"American" varieties would virtually eliminate any separation and would 
inevitably intensify competition among sellers in markets for wheat of fair 
average quality.
It is not possible to determine with certainty whether these reasons 
were responsible for the delay in licensing HY320, but a comment by a CWB 
commissioner suggests they may have been important. The commissioner told 
a group of producers at the end of 1985 that if more medium - qual i ty wheat 
had been planted that year, the CWB could not have exported it all 
(including the high-quality wheat that was down-graded due to rain damage) 
in competition with similar wheat that the United States and the EEC are 
selling with $30 and $40/ton subsidies (Ewins).
A study by the Canada Grains Council declared "the delay In [HY320] 
being licensed seems to be the philosophy that Canada should not compete in 
the medium- to lower-protein market" (CGC, n.d. , p . 10). The same study 
indicated that Canada would have to be a price-taker in the market for 3M 
wheat, but that it could play the role of fringe supplier and "could do 
some limited price-cutting without fear of retaliatory pricing by the major 
exporters in this market" (p. 38).
It remains to be seen how much 3M wheat Canadian farmers will produce 
and how much the CWB will allow them to deliver for export. It may be more 
than a coincidence that the grades for which evidence exists of the use of 
supply restrictions, CWRS No. 3 and Canada Utility, are precisely those 
which compete more directly with American, Australian, and EEC supplies of 
average-quality wheat. It would probably be overly skeptical to conclude 
that the Board is not really concerned about visual distinguishability and 
the deterioration of Canada's reputation for superior-quality wheat. But 
it would seem to be realistic to conclude that a reluctance to compete with 
the United States and other exporters has played a role in delaying 
approval of the new wheat varieties.
IS
3.0. A MODEL OF EXCESS DEMAND FOR CANADIAN WHEAT
It was argued In the previous section that the recent behavior of the 
Canadian Wheat Board is broadly consistent with its stated objectives, but 
some apparent contradictions remain. This section develops a model of ex­
cess demand for Canadian wheat which resolves these contradictions.
3•1' Elasticity of Substitution Between Types of Wheat
As Oleson has stressed, differing demand by type of wheat Is an 
aspect of the world wheat market which is often neglected by analysts. 
Demand for high-protein wheat, which usually makes up over 70 percent of 
Canadian supplies, probably exhibits significant changes In price elastici­
ty over a range of quantities and prices. Demand may be quite price 
inelastic for small quantities because buyers have needs for which other 
wheats are poor substitutes. Additional quantities of high-protein wheat 
compete with lower-quality wheat in uses where the elasticity of substitu­
tion Is higher (Tomek and Robinson; Oleson).
Recently, the price differential between high- and medium-quality 
wheat has been sufficiently stable and small to suggest that supplies of 
high-quality wheat are competing with wheat of lower quality (albeit at a 
slight premium) in the general market for bread wheats. For example, Mants 
et al. provide data on prices in Japan. They argue that price premiss for 
quality in this market can be considered world maxima because the Japanese 
are known to pay a premium for top-quality wheat. Average prices from 
1977/78 to 1981/82, in U. S. dollars per metric ton, were $212 for No. 1 
CWRS (13.5 percent protein), and $182 for both Australian Standard White 
and U.S. No.2 Hard Winter Ordinary (13 percent protein). Between 1964/65 
and 1980/81, the average difference in price between No. 1 CWRS and the 
latter two grades was 15.7 percent, with a maximum of 26.9 percent in 
1973/74, a minimum of 10.3 percent in 1978/79, and a standard deviation of 
4.8 percent. Mants et al. also note that two American grades which differ 
primarily by protein content (No. 2 Dark Northern Spring, 14 percent, and 
No. 2 Hard Red Winter, 13 percent) differed in price by an average of $6/mt 
over the same period.
The data suggest that, while customers (especially the Japanese) are 
willing to pay a premium for high protein and other quality differences, 
this premium remains fairly constant despite changes in the relative 
amounts of the various qualities produced. In some years, a shortage of 
top grades (e.g., in Canada in 1980/81) or strong demand for top grades 
tends to Increase the price differential, but in most years the premium 
appears to be limited by the fact that over a substantial proportion of 
their total demand customers can adjust their usage across competing quali­
ties without much difficulty.
Nevertheless, as indicated by the variation in the premium for Cana­
dian wheat, the potential substitution between wheat of different grades 
and between wheat from different suppliers is less than perfect. This is 
due to both political and technical factors. As a result, the CWB has some 
discretion in pricing Its wheat, and there is no single "world price" even 
if the various wheat prices move more or less together.
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If Canada alone raises its price for high-protein wheat, millers will 
substitute more medium-protein wheat, Canada sells less than it would If 
all exporters raised prices together, but It still sells some high-protein 
wheat. This is shown in Figure 3.1, where qa and are high- and medium- 
protein wheat, respectively, and 0^, C^, and 0g are isoquants for produc­
tion of increasing amounts of flour of constant quality. If the prices of 
high- and medium-protein wheat increase in the same proportion, the budget 
line will shift in a parallel fashion and the input mix changes from A to C 
to D. But if only the price of high-protein wheat rises, the mix changes 
from A to B to E, which leads to a more elastic demand for qa . The higher 
the elasticity of substitution between Canadian and other export wheats, 
the more market share Canada loses when it raises its price. If U.S. or 
Australian grades compete well with Canadian high-protein wheat, and if 
there are excess supplies of these substitutes, the CWB would sell very 
little if it raised its price above those of its competitors. This 
explains why oligopolists typically try to differentiate their products. 
Differentiation enhances their ability to set prices.
The elasticity of substitution for wheat is also directly related to 
the U.S. elasticity of stocks adjustment. During periods of surplus and 
before the Export Enhancement Program was expanded in 1986, the U.S. loan 
rate and government stock accumulation held the price of U.S. wheat exports 
relatively steady. At least in the short term, Canada could change its 
export price knowing that the U.S. price would remain unchanged. Thus, in 
the short run, the effective elasticity of U.S. supply with respect to 
Canadian price was zero because price transmission was zero. The elastici­
ty of substitution between the products of competing suppliers effectively 
determines the extent to which Canada and other exporters can displace 
American supplies and, ultimately, the amount of grain the United States 
exports. For instance, the higher the elasticity of substitution, the more 
U.S. exports will be displaced and the more U.S. stocks will accumulate as 
a result of a given price reduction by a competing exporter.
It follows that the U.S. loan program may support not only domestic 
U.S. prices but also the level of world prices. If the United States is 
willing to accumulate stocks rather than reduce its prices, other exporters 
will have no need to set prices much below the loan rate unless there Is 
poor substitution between their wheat and U.S. wheat. As a result, during 
periods of surplus the U.S. loan program acts to support world wheat prices 
at levels near the loan rate.
3.2. A Model of Kinked Excess Demand for Canadian Wheat
Given the small number of major wheat exporters, the lack of a homo­
geneous product, and the dependence of demand for Canadian wheat exports on 
the relationship between Canadian prices and the U.S. loan rate, the clas­
sical theory of competitive oligopoly and kinked demand can be used to ana­
lyze the characteristics of excess demand for Canadian wheat. A graphical 
representation of this theory is shown in Figure 3.2, where DD is Canada's 
demand curve if all oligopolists change price together and maintain market 
shares, and dd is Canada's demand curve if Canada alone changes price. In 
other words, dd is the demand for Canadian wheat as a separate good assum­
ing the prices of close substitutes (i.e ., supplies from other exporters)
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Figure 3.1. Quantity effects of price changes for high protein and 
medium protein wheat
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Figure 3.2. Competitive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve
Quantity
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remain constant at P0„ MG is the marginal cost of wheat for Canadian pro­
ducers (Henderson and Quandt),
According to the theory of competitive oligopoly, competitors will 
match a price decrease by the CWB, and Canada will face the demand curve 
DD. If the CWB raises its price, however, competitors will not follow the 
lead but instead will try to increase their market shares. ■ In this case, 
Canada faces the curve dd. Canadaf s excess demand curve would, therefore, 
be kinked at price PQ, which is the established price of its competitors, 
and its marginal revenue curve (MR) would be discontinuous. Thus, Canada's 
sales remain stable at qQ (and world price remains at P ) under a variety 
of conditions. It should be noted, however, that if the Canadian marginal 
cost curve is MC2, i „ e, , above the kink in the demand curve, then the kink 
is irrelevant.
Since the early 1980s, the U.S. loan program has determined the. level 
of world wheat prices and effectively established a kink in the demand 
curves faced by other exporters. The U.S. program was not flexible enough 
prior to 1986 to' respond immediately to price-cutting by competitors, so 
other exporters were able to sell at prices below the U, S. loan rate and 
still experience elastic demand on their respective dd schedules.
In a stagnant market, increased sales by other exporters are likely 
to come at the expense of U S. market share if the TJ.S. loan rate is above 
market-clearing levels. It is difficult for Canada to capture any of 
Argentina's market share because Argentina will probably match Canada's 
price-cuts 3 as will Australia and the ESC. However, there is a point at 
which the United States retaliates, as evidenced by the expansion of the 
Export Enhancement Program in 1986. In Figure 3.3 price ?k is the point of 
retaliation and marks the actual kink in the demand curve. is the U. S. 
loan rate. This situation implies that Canada can reduce its price as far 
as Pk and sell before the United.States retaliates.
In practices the kink at Pfc is ill-defined, since the United States 
has implemented price retaliation by degrees. The initial U.S. reaction to 
the price-cutting of its competitors during the early 1980s was to- insti­
tute relatively modest indirect export subsidies. Later these were greatly 
expanded. Eventually, In 1986 the United States retaliated directly by 
lowering the loan rate and, hence, world prices. Even before the United 
States lowered the loan price, its indirect retaliation made it more diffi­
cult for Canada and other competitors to capture U. S. customers. Demand 
for .Canada's wheat became more inelastic, 1.e ., the demand schedule 
approached DD. The kink is , therefore, "soft* and actually consists more 
of a zone of transition from dd to DD than an abrupt kink at P^ .
Lack of full information on prices also contributes to the ’softness" 
of the kink. Because most of the GWB's sales are made at negotiated and 
unannounced prices, it is difficult for competing exporters to follow 
Canada's lead when the latter reduces its price. Even if the U. S. govern­
ment concludes (perhaps because Canada's market share is growing) that the 
CWB has been cutting its price, the United States cannot retaliate quickly 
except perhaps through targeted "export assistance." This problem con­
tributes to the selective nature of U.5. retaliation which results in an 
ill-defined kink.
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Figure 3.3. Kinked demand for Canadian wheat exports
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Argentina and the EEC, and perhaps Canada and Australia, have in fact 
been selling according to their respective dd curves beyond the kink, and 
it is this which has provoked U.S. retaliation. The U.S. decision to lower 
the loan rate in 1986 was not triggered solely by other exporters exceeding 
a certain export volume or pricing below a certain price. Rather, the 
decision was the result of a complex set of events, including the cumula­
tive impact of the loss of foreign markets, continued high production in 
the U.S., and expiration of the 1981 farm act which provided an opportunity 
to reevaluate U.S. farm programs. Once U.S. retaliation became certain, 
competing exporters took maximum advantage to export wheat before the new 
U.S. loan rates came into effect. This partially explains why U.S. wheat 
exports declined to 25 mmt in 1985/86 from 38 Emit the previous year.
At the lower U.S. loan rate, in Figure 3.3, the kink is re-estab­
lished at a lower price (Pk f) assuming U.S. flexibility . to retaliate 
remains limited. Canada can now undersell the new loan rate and increase 
sales according to demand schedule d'd' up to q9. If the kink is estab­
lished low enoughf however, so that Canada' s cost of producing q2 tons of 
wheat exceeds P^' , the kink will be irrelevant for Canada because the CWB 
will try to avoid exporting at a loss. In fact, the United States govern­
ment is hoping that the new loan rate for wheat is sufficiently low that 
Canadian farmers will find it unprofitable to produce for export. In 
this case, Canadian exports would decline from f enabling the U.S. to 
regain some of its market share. However, if farmers in Canada, Argentina, 
Australia, and the EEC are willing to continue to produce at the lower 
prices, or their governments are willing to bear the cost of insulating 
domestic prices from world prices, the United States will have difficulty 
regaining lost markets.
A final caveat concerning the above model is necessary. The model 
implies that in each year the CWB makes a single decision about how much 
wheat to sell and at what price to sell. This obviously is unrealistic. 
The Wheat Board adjusts its pricing strategy throughout the marketing year. 
The harvests of the Australian and Argentine crops from November to Febru­
ary give the Board a better sense of residual demand. As the end of the 
marketing year approaches, the CWB receives estimates of the next Canadian 
crop. All of these considerations are likely to affect the Board's deci­
sion of how much wheat to sell in the current year and how much of a price 
discount is acceptable or necessary to move any unsold grain. Any grain 
that cannot be sold at acceptable prices or without disrupting the market 
must be stored. Though the model cannot capture these complex dynamic 
processes exactly, it provides an approximation of actual behavior.
3.3. The...Impact of Other Exporters on the Demand Facing Canada
The discussion above has focused on the relationship between Canadian 
and U.S. export behavior and largely ignores the behavior of Argentina, 
Australia, and the EEC. While the U.S. loan program has had a major impact 
on the demand for Canadian wheat exports, the CWB must also consider the 
behavior of other wheat exporters.
The nature of excess demand facing Argentina, Australia, and the EEC 
has also been dominated by the U.S. loan program. During periods of sur­
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plus in the United States, each of these countries faces a demand that is 
kinked slightly below the loan rate, just as Canada does. These exporters 
can expand their sales by pricing below the U.S. loan rate to displace U.S. 
sales. Because the United States has less flexibility to match price-cuts 
than other exporters, one would expect these exporters to try to displace 
U.S. wheat sales before those of a third country.
Under such conditions, the Canadian Wheat Board must consider its 
pricing strategy in the context of the actions of other exporters. During 
a year in which. Argentina or the EEC has less than normal supplies and is, 
therefore, discounting prices to a reduced extent, the CWB should be able 
to offer price discounts to win additional customers from them without pro­
voking U.S. retaliation. Conversely, when other exporters have large sup­
plies of wheat for export, Canada will have difficulty selling wheat to 
infrequent customers because competition will be strong. Even if the CWB 
targets U.S. markets, it may face competition from other exporters trying 
to capture these markets. This is particularly likely since Argentina, 
Australia, and the EEC appear to be less willing than Canada to hold 
stocks.  ^ Since the CWB knows that other exporters are likely to match Cana­
dian price reductions, the CWB will be willing to store some wheat to avoid 
selling at severe discounts and provoking U.S, retaliation. So when other 
(non-U.S.) exporters have large crops, the CWB is more likely to accumulate 
stocks than when competing exporters have small crops. The CWB must also 
be prepared to counter attempts by other exporters to displace Canadian 
sales to the CWB's regular customers.
The historical record suggests that the level of production in other 
exporting countries has had significant effects on Canadian exports. In 
1984/85, for example, production in the EEC increased by 30 percent com­
pared to the previous three years. Half of the 17 mmt increase was carried 
oyer to the next year in storage, but EEC exports increased by 5 mmt. 
Higher EEC exports should have resulted in substantial price-cutting, but 
this was ameliorated by an Australian drought during the same year. A pro- 
jected small crop in Argentina in 1985/86 made it possible for Canada as 
well as Australia and the EEC to expand exports with only limited price- 
cutting ,
Policy decisions in other countries also affect Canada's ability to 
expand its wheat exports. In 1980, for example, with the partial embargo 
of wheat sales to the USSR, the United States relinquished a major portion 
of the Soviet market. Other exporters were able to increase their market 
share without provoking U.S. retaliation. In May, 1981 the CWB signed a 
long - term agreement with the USSR which called for an average of 5 mmt of 
wheat exports per year for five years, compared to average trade of 1.6 
mmt/year during the five years before the embargo. EEC wheat exports to 
the USSR increased from less than 1 mmt In 1980/81 to 6 mmt in 1984/85 
(USDA, 1985).
In addition, the demand for Canadian wheat is influenced by the 
grades of ^ wheat produced by other exporters. Argentina competes most 
directly with U.S. hard red winter wheat, and Australia competes with U.S. 
and Canadian white wheats. Canada competes directly with the United States 
for sales of both hard red spring and durum wheat, Canada's two most impor- 
tant classes (CGC, 1985). Thus, the most important factors influencing the
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export demand facing Canada ate the size of the U. S. crop and where U.S. 
prices are in relation to the loan rate„ Events in other exporting coun­
tries will affect the nature of demand as described above, especially if 
the CWB wishes to dispose of large quantities of medium- or feed-quality 
wheat.
3•^* Canada?s Elasticity of Excess Demand
The analysis in section 2 of this report suggested that the feasi­
bility of alternative CWB export strategies depends upon the elasticity of 
excess demand facing Canada. This elasticity, and how it varies with sales 
volume and price, determines the feasibility of storing wheat in years when 
availability is high relative to demand. In the medium term, the ability 
of Canada to increase its exports without losing revenue depends upon the 
elasticity of the excess demand curve.
According to the model of kinked demand presented above, the excess 
demand for Canadian wheat is more elastic above the kink than below the 
kink. This still leaves open the possibility that demand is elastic (or 
inelastic) both above and below the kink. In the case of elastic demand 
below the kink, the CWB could theoretically increase revenue by selling 
along the DD curve. But the substantial price-cut caused by U.S. retalia­
tion would make It difficult for Canada to maintain its production and 
export levels, much less expand them to increase revenue. So the CWB is 
likely-to be reluctant to provoke U.S, retaliation.
If demand facing the CWB is inelastic above the kink, then the Board 
may be reluctant to export enough wheat to approach the point of U.S. re­
taliation , since increased volume causes decreased revenue. In this case 
the kink would not be a decisive factor in CWB strategies. For this rea­
son, it is important to determine whether the demand for Canadian wheat 
exports is elastic above the point of U.S. retaliation.
Employing an "indirect approach", the price elasticity of excess 
demand facing Canada can be calculated from elasticities of supply, demand 
and price transmission in importers and competing exporters (Horner; 
Tweeten). Despite its simplicity, the indirect estimation of the excess 
elasticity can fee useful in deriving qualitative conclusions, particularly 
if sensitivity analysis is used to evaluate the impact of changing basic 
assumptions. Following Bredahl et' al., the elasticity of excess demand 
facing a country j can be calculated as follows
d - 1’ Eed,j “ E V Edi«di/\j) - EpiEs i « si/Qxj>]. i+J
where E ^  is the elasticity of price transmission from the world to the 
domestic market in the ith country, and Eg  ^are the domestic elastici-
tles of demand and supply for the ith country, Qdi and Q , are domestic 
levels of demand and supply for country i for a chosen base period, and Q . 
is exports of the j th country. Of interest here is the case where the j tn 
country is Canada, and the i's are members of the set of all other coun- 
tries or regions. Equation (3.1) describes the elasticity of excess demand 
for the period of time over which the various elasticities are defined.
27
When U .S. price is at or below the loan rate, U .S. stock adjustment 
replaces production response. This occurs because producer prices will be 
stable due to the loan program (and deficiency payments) and production is 
unaffected by lower prices. Variation in U.S. wheat exports will be 
reflected in inventory changes. Under these circumstances, Canada's elas- 
ticity of excess demand should be calculated using equation (3.1) for all 
countries except the United States. For the United States, the following 
equation should be used
(3*2) Eed, j “ EpiEdi^di/Qxj^ " EpiEki^kl/Qxj >; i=“u -s*
where is the elasticity of stocks adjustment with respect to domestic 
price, and is the level of domestic stocks in country i (the United 
States). To obtain a total Ee^ for Canada, the elasticity derived from 
(3.2) is added to the sum for all other countries from (3.1).
A price decrease below the loan rate could theoretically cause all 
U.S. production to go into government storage, and E^. us would be practi­
cally infinite. Calculations involving this elasticity are performed 
assuming values of E ^ us=-2.0 and E^ us=-5.0. The remaining country and 
regional elasticities ’ (supply, demandf, and price transmission) are based 
upon those in USDA, 1986. The supply, demand and transmission elasticity 
estimates are combined with average production, consumption, and U.S. 
stocks for the period 1982-1984, and used to calculate the elasticity of 
exc ess demand.J
When prices are below the U.S. loan rate but above the kink in the 
demand curve, Canada's elasticity of excess demand is estimated to be -8.0 
if Efc us=-2.0 and -13.5 if E^. us=-5.0. This assumes some production and 
consumption response (equation 3.1) in all countries except the United 
States, where only stocks and consumption are assumed to respond (equation 
3.2). Below the kink, the United States is assumed to match Canadian 
changes. If U.S. producer prices are also allowed to reflect world market 
conditions, then equation (3.1) can be used for the U.S. response as well. 
Under these assumptions, the excess demand elasticity facing Canada is 
estimated to be -4.9.
The calculation of excess demand elasticities depends upon many 
assumptions and rough estimates of country and regional elasticities, but 
it is reasonable to conclude that Canada faces elastic demand for its wheat 
exports when prices are at or just below the U.S. loan rate. When the 
United States retaliates by matching Canadian and other exporters' prices 
with subsidies or by lowering the loan rate, it appears that Canada still 
faces elastic demand, although demand is less elastic than above the kink. 
As noted above, the substantial price-cuts involved in U.S. retaliation 
make it unlikely that Canadian producers would expand production (and 
thereby exports) to try to increase revenue. Since Canada will be worse 
off after retaliation, the CWB might try to avoid provoking such action. 3
3 The elasticities and data are given in Sinner, along with a more complete 
description of the calculations themselves.
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As noted above, one problem with this methodology is the assumption 
o perfect elasticity of substitution between suppliers and grades of 
wheat. These are unrealistic assumptions, at least for the short run If 
an importer has developed a reliable relationship with a given exporter 
using a certain type of wheat, the importer is unlikely to switch to a dif. 
ferent supplier for the sake of small and perhaps temporary price savings 
especially if the second supplier is offering wheat of a different type or 
quality Hence, Canada's short-run elasticity of excess demand may be sub­
stantially less than suggested by the above calculations.
, . has been arSued that the indirect estimation of the excess demand
elasticity can reflect the elasticity of substitution by adjusting the 
lc? transiBlssion elasticity downwards (Cronin). This is difficult given 
the lack of quantitative information on substitution elasticities. Bredahl 
—  r for example, define price transmission elasticities in such a way 
as to incorporate barriers to transmission such as tariffs or quotas but 
not those due to quality differences or customer loyalty.
If excess demand is inelastic in the short term, Canada would lose 
revenue If it lowered its price in an attempt to attract additional cus­
tomers. In the medium term, however, price differences can be expected to 
cause importers to shift their sources of supply. if importers can be rea­
sonably certain that favorable terms will persist, they will probably make 
the effort to adapt their end-use processes to a different grade of wheat 
and to learn the logistics of dealing with a new supplier. It can, there- 
fore, be concluded that Canada faces elastic excess demand in the medium 
term as the above estimates suggest.
3.5. Implications gf_£he_Jjodel_for Canadian Export Strategy
It has been argued that excess demand for Canadian wheat has been
characterized by a kinked function with the kink somewhere below the U.S.
loan rate.^ Above the kink, demand is elastic in the medium term but
inelastic in the short term. If the Canadian Wheat Board' sells wheat at
prices below the kink, it is likely to provoke one of two types of retalia­
tion by the United States. Minor price-cutting by the CWB will probably 
a tract increased U.S. competition in the form of export subsidies, making 
excess demand for Canadian wheat more inelastic. When there is surplus 
production, substantial short-run price discounting by the CWB (relative to 
. 'S • prices) ’ or less substantial discounting over a series of years 
increase the likelihood that the United States will retaliate by lowering 
t e loan rate While the elasticity of demand facing Canada above and 
below the new kink established after the loan rate reduction might be simi­
lar to that around the previous kink, the price level would clearly be 
lower. J
„ If thls ls an accurate interpretation of the demand conditions facing 
haS lfflportant ^Plications for the export marketing strategy of 
the CWB. In particular, the model explains the apparent inconsistencies 
between the CWB's stated objectives and Its observed behavior. These 
irifclude a reluctance to license high-yielding varieties and the use of 
storage as a buffer. In addition, the model suggests how the CWB might use 
price discounts to develop additional markets.
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Licensing of New Varieties
The risk of U.S. retaliation might account for the reluctance of the 
CUB in approving new wheat cultivars which can yield up to 30 percent more 
than current Canadian varieties. Increased exports of this magnitude could 
only be achieved by displacing the supplies of another exporter, and wi 
its loan program the U.S. has been a frequent loser due to price discount­
ing by the EEC and Argentina. If Canada followed this strategy and dis­
placed U.S. sales by offering 3M wheat that is similar to U.S. hard red 
winter wheat, it would increase the risk of U.S. retaliation.
The timing of the CWB's decision (in January 1985) to license a high- 
yielding variety makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions about the 
causes and effects of the decision. In announcing the change m  policy, 
the Minister for the CWB said, "It has become clear that market conditions 
have changed over the years. We believe that HY320 will help us maintain 
and expand our market share" (Mayer). A press release by the CWB a year 
later said the new variety is intended for "more price conscious customers
(CWB, 1986b).
Since HY320 was opened for unrestricted production for the first time 
in 1986 it is unlikely that the change In CWB policy had much to do with 
the U.S.' decision to lower its loan rate. Rather, the Canadian statements 
suggest that price-cutting by other exporters was affecting Canada as it 
was the United States. The circumstances which contributed to the Canadian 
decision were the same as those contributing to the U.S. decision. 
Nonetheless, the fact that Canadian authorities were reluctant to approve 
the new varieties until forced to do so by widespread price-cutting is con­
sistent with the model of kinked demand and efforts to avoid U.S. 
retaliation.
Use of Buffer Stocks
The threat of U.S. retaliation would also be sufficient to explain 
the CWB's use of buffer stocks when Canada's average level of wheat exports 
is close to the kink in the demand curve. If sales of weather-induced sur­
pluses of wheat would risk U.S. retaliation, the CWB would probably prefer 
to store the excess until a year of low production or strong demand. Occa­
sional quota restrictions are simply the mechanism used to keep excess 
grain stored on farms to avoid congestion of the handling system.
Even if a random increase in exports would not increase the danger of 
U.S. retaliation, the CWB is likely to find the use of buffer stocks more 
acceptable than price reduction as a mechanism to deal with excess supplies 
because demand is inelastic in the short run. Variations m  demand from 
Canada's customers would be expected to have a similar effect. Decreased 
demand would cause the CWB to increase stocks to avoid selling at un­
acceptable discounts. Conversely, increased demand could enable the CWB to 
export above- average supplies and avoid storage.
The tendency to use storage to buffer variable production and varia­
ble demand is reinforced by the CWB's desire to maintain its reputation as 
a reliable supplier (Oleson). Priority customers are primarily those with
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whom Canada has long-term agreements, but also Include Great Britain the
Netherlands, and Cuba. If available supplies are below expectation^ i n a
cannotyoff;rtsuffiBlritkS Un??rmlnln6 the loyalV  °f these customers if it cannot offer sufficient supplies, or if it raises its prices significantly
e world levels. Canada's attractiveness as a supplier (i e its elas­
tic demand m  the medium term) depends in part on its reliability It L  
presumed that demand is inelastic in the short-tens precise^ because many 
importers do not like to change suppliers and types of wheat7 While aain- 
tainmg precautionary stocks may not be the primary motive for CWB storage 
t does increase the benefits of storage and weighs against the ruR>= 
stated intention of maintaining pipeline stocks only.
Price Discounts for Market Development
Finally, if the CWB expects increasing production and exportable sur
these°IuppHeesmedC l  " T '  1C I s ^ a b l e  to develop regular markets for these supplies While disposal of short-term surpluses to infreouent r,,,
attractat 3 dlSCOUnt iSc “ active, discounts can be j u s t T S  if the;
p“ c“  in C1986°m a^c™ ° ^  be°°me re®Ular bu^ a at ^discount5:,' f - ln l9.86- a CWB ®ales representative said, "Our long-term market development objectives have an effect on our pricing d e c i ^ n T  W e z r l  
sometimes prepered to discount small lots of certain types of grain if ™
feel we can get a foothold in a new market" (Man'* 1 /  g ^  ™
Canadian wheat is elastic in the medium term, the CWB s h o u Y d ^ e "  to
mode] n; L « S artaCt T mrtS Wlth°U; t0° mUCh dl«i=uity. The kinked demand
discouatf to D s V  f he PaSb th® !asiest way t0 do 80 has been to offer discounts to U.S. customers since the U.S. could not match trice redur
ions, as long as the CWB was careful not to provoke retaliation.
Board a"aiysls.suSgest® that the recent behavior of the Canadian Wheat
that rh RU a 00nsistent with its stated objectives. One qualification is
that the Board seems to be protecting producer interests by trying to avoid 
disruptmg the market (which would Increase the likelihood of U.S t l
a ™  °fficlals say decisions about how « c h  and S c h  type of wheat to produce are left entirely to farmers.
3-6' £utth££-J^ance_for_a«^  of Kinked Demand
It has been argued above that CWB behavior is consistent with if, 
objectives and the model of kinked demand described earlier. This subsec-
b^avfor " ^  Sh°W ^  m°del 18 °0nsiatant witb other aspects of CWB
Regularity of Canadian Customers
„„„ w a s ™ ted earlier that importers of wheat are reluctant to switch
ppliers uniess substantial and/or consistent price advantages can be 
gained Thus, one would expect the CWB to attempt to serve primarily regu­
lar customers in order to minimize the amount it must discount to sell to
S r  i m / 85erS91 Tabl% 3 f1 ^  that «""* five-year period1980/81 1984/85, 91 percent of exports of Canada's top two grades of
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wheat went to 15 countries who made purchases of these grades in each of 
the five years. The addition of 11 more countries which made purchases in 
three or four of the five years raises the percentage to about 97 percent 
for the top two grades. Similar patterns are evident for other grades. 
For example, 73 percent of exports of CWRS No.3 were taken by two countries 
which bought at least some No. 3 each year. Between 1975/76 and 1979/80, 
79.3 percent of exports of Canadian feed wheat went to three countries 
which made purchases of that grade in at least four of the five years. 
Table 3.2 shows that, while the percentage of exports shipped to regular 
customers varies, it is always high. For example, for Nos. 1 and 2 CWRS, 
this percentage ranged from 99.3 percent with the short crop of 1975/76 to 
82.6 percent the next year.
Statements made by the CWB indicate that the Board gives high priori­
ty to regular customers. A sales representative reported that customers 
with whom Canada has signed long-term agreements have top priority in years 
when available supplies are low. Only when those commitments are filled 
does the Sales Office know how much it can offer to infrequent customers 
(CWB, 1986a). In urging farmers to deliver their grain early after the 
poor harvest of 1984, the CWB stated, "The odds are that this year's crop 
is a temporary break in a trend of increasing production, and that next 
year's crop will be a better one. Customers will be needed for those big­
ger crops, and one of the keys to making sure they will still be there is 
to show Canada is making every effort to keep exports going through 
1984/85, and maximizing exports under the circumstances" (CWB, 1984b).
In late 1985, after harvest rains resulted in large quantities of 
lower-quality grain, the Board told farmers, "We have not had large amounts 
of 3 CW for a couple of years, and therefore do not have a steady group of 
customers for that grade.... We are actively pursuing additional markets, 
and quota levels for the balance of the year will reflect how successful 
we've been" (CWB, 1985b).
Over the past several years the CWB has increased its supply commit­
ments under long-term agreements from about 3 mmt per year during the lat­
ter half of the 1970s to 12.7 mmt in 1984/85. This supports the view that 
the Wheat Board's marketing strategy focuses on a set of regular customers. 
In order to ensure the availability of supplies to these customers, the CWB 
must keep some stocks on hand to guard against a poor crop. The Board, 
therefore, forces farmers to store excess supplies when there is a bumper 
crop and allows deliveries from stocks when the crop is below expectations.
Buffer Stocks for Individual Grades of Wheat
On the basis of the model, it is to be expected that the patterns 
that characterize overall CWB export behavior will be reflected in the 
exports of individual grades of wheat. The previous subsection showed that 
the CWB's tendency to serve primarily regular customers holds for CWRS Nos. 
1 and 2 as well as for all wheat. In this subsection, it will be argued 
that the use of buffer stocks also applies to individual grades.
To verify this proposition is difficult because neither stocks nor 
domestic use is reported by individual grades. Nevertheless, the use of
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Table 3.1 Percentage of Canadian wheat exports acconm-=a *■ , ,
customers, selected grades, 1980/81-1984/85 7 COnsistent
Grade
All grades 
except durum
Number 
of
countries
Number of 
years making 
purchases
5 of 5 
4 of 5 
3 of 5
Average annual 
purchases
10.34 
0.20 
0.46
Percent 
of exports 
of grade
Table 3.2 Volume and percentage of Canadian exports of s e W ^ a
accounted for by consistent customers f  se^ ^ e d  grades
CWRS Nos. 1 and 2 
mmt %
4.67
6.97 
7.70
5.98 
7.36
7.78
10.30
11.51
11.56
10.41
99.3
82.6
87.0
93.9 
93.6
94.9
86.0
93.0
93.1
89.3
All grades** 
mmt %
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85
^Consistent customers aredefinedas c o u l ^ t ^ T T h l T T ^ —  u--- — =-----
given grades in each year of the five year period T t  P“rchases of the on the total volume of exnorts of P i d’ Percentages are based**Except durum. exP°rts of the indicated grade in a given year.
Source: Mants et al.; Can. Grain Comm. (1976-1985).
8.81 
8.84 
11.80 
10.41 
12.50
12.16
12.83
15.92
16.67
12.64
88.5
80.3
88.9
95.1 
94.7
90.1
81.9
87.1 
89.0
82.9
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buffer stocks by grade can be inferred by examining data on Prod"ctd°"' 
liveries to the CWB, and exports of wheat by grade. These dat 
Nos. 1 and 2 and CWRS No. 3 are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, re p 
tively. Average exports are less than average production because of domes­
tic use. It is evident from the coefficient of variation that exports are 
less variable than production, and for Nos. 1 and 2, also ess 
than deliveries to the CWB. This can only be explained by “f® o£ 
stocks, since domestic use of these grades varies litt e. _ 
supports the hypothesis that the CWB is forced to store wheat in excess of 
demand from regular customers in order to avoid selling at discount prices.
This explanation is also consistent with the way in which the Wheat 
Board has recently administered its delivery quota system. As| noted ea - 
lier, quotas are generally not restrictive in that they have little e 
on how much wheat acreage farmers plant, but quotas have restricted deliv 
ery of certain grades of wheat in certain years. This is apparently due to 
short-term inelasticities related to the reluctance of importers to change 
suppliers or types of wheat. Restrictive quotas are sometimes used to 
force farmers to store wheat not needed to supply regular customers For 
instance in 1976 farmers produced almost 18 mmt of CWRS Nos. 1 and 2, but 
the CWB accepted delivery of only 11.5 mmt. In the medium u n ,  demand is 
more elastic and Canada can increase its sales by moderate price reductions 
or by offering attractive long-term contracts. Thus, the CWB took delivery 
of the excess from 1976 gradually over the next several years.
Emphasis by CWB Officials on Market Share
According to one Commissioner, one of the objectives of the CWB is to
maintain its percentage share of the world market (CWB 1986a) . This 
objective seems aimed at assuring markets for Canadian supplies at accepta­
ble prices rather than at maximizing market share for its own sake. While 
the model presented here assumes elastic demand for Canadian exports in 
medium term, it does not mean the CWB can neglect its regular customer^ 
As noted above, the difference between the short-term and the medium-term 
elasticity is precisely the assurance of a steady supply of a known grade 
of wheat. If the CWB neglects its reputation as a reliable supplier, 
may find itself losing regular customers that are difficult to regain or
replace.
An official of the CWB said the Board would probably react favorably 
to any proposal for a new International Wheat Agreement that would stabi­
lize prices, but he doubted that agreement could be reached on price an
market share provisions. The situation is ^ipyos resultedfact that Canada's transportation constraints in the latter 197 
in decreased market shares that were not indicative ofpanada a 
"traditional" share of the market. Canada is now trying to reestablish its 
claim to the share of the market it enjoyed before those constraints becam 
binding (CWB, 1986a).
If the above analysis correctly describes Canadian export behavior 
then one might ask why market shares have fluctuated so much in the past 
decade In part, these fluctuations can be explained by variable produc 
tion in both exporting and importing countries. Since exporters have
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Table 3.3.
Crop
Year
Production, deliveries,
Production
and exports of CWRS Nos 1 and 2 whe^t.*
Deliveries Exports
1973/74 11.901974/75 5.001975/76 9.06
1976/77 17.981977/78 7.521978/79 10.831979/80 9.45
1980/81 8.181981/82 17.231982/83 11.721983/84 17.681984/85 NA
- - mrat -
NA 8.674.22 5.69NA 4.7011.52 8.446.11 8.868.60 6.40
10.74 7.9711.01 8.2914.23 11.9915.12 12.3815.03 12.4213.29 11.66
Mean (mmt)
Std. dev. (mmt) 
Coefficient of
11.51
4.19 10.99 3.53 8.96 2.54
variation** .36 .32 .28
NA = not available.
CWB^this fo™eo^;bined bSCaUSe SOme °f the data are - ailable the
**The coefficient of variation equals the standard deviation divided by the
Source C W B ^ m f l Va^ atlces of saI”Ples *lth different means. Source. CwB, 1973-1984a; Canadian Grain Comm., 1974-1985.
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Table 3.4. Production, deliveries, and exports of CWRS No. 3 wheat.
Crop
Year Production Deliveries Exports
1973/74 2.03
1974/75 3.45
1975/76 3.90
1976/77 0.99
1977/78 6.47
1978/79 4.72
1979/80 3.34
1980/81 6.87
1981/82 3.11
1982/83 6.43
1983/84 4.59
1984/85 NA
Mean (mmt) 4.17
Std. dev. (mmt) 1.79
Coefficient of
variation .43
mmt
NA 0.77
2.93 1.89
NA 2.71
0.58 1.30
1.58 2.83
2.06 3.17
2.91 3.33
5.15 3.88
1.52 2.28
3.33 3.32
3.70 3.81
1.51 1.94
2.53 2.60
1.27 0.94
.50 .36
NA = not available.
Source: CWB, 1973-1984a; Canadian Grain Comm., 1974-1985.
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affect e x p o r t ^ r Inl^rket shares will change^ "  BS7Pt WlU
3.7. ^^ngeS-niL^WB_Jtr:ategy Since 1980/81
Of binding transportation Lnd handling coTr 1 aCC™ ulate stocks because 
the CWB continued to increase extort. .*1™  ^  During thls Period,
according to availability in a given year * “®diu,":{;eri” trend rather than
more flexibility and has7 taken fdvant-L t .S e then the Board has had
1984/85, annual production d e l  t "  Z  °f ^  , In the Peri°d 1980/81 - 
cant factor in determining exports thf, ^  7 T ±C US6) became * signifi- 
partial buffer. In other words’ t h / n !  f  continued to be used as a 
exports in response to short term h- ^  PartlaH y  adjusted annual 
Because infrequent customers account for 5S10 ^  “ "“t1 Pliabilities.
can afford a slight shortfall in K .^ percent of exports, the CWB
relationships with loyal clients S a v i n g ' without Jeopardizing its
while to sell some e x t r a  grain ev en  i f  /  a ? t o r f ge costs make it worth- 
short run. Accordingly the ratio of S Slight^  inelast^  in the
declined significantly since 1978/79. Ganadlan stocks to production has
Of Nos. 1 & 2 CWRS, the CWB may have to loolTaflo5 s” Pbus - especially
Board might carry over surnlus if ir i a * f-f 1 er'priced markets. -The 
With the world wheat econo^ in surplus an ff-"- *?” f°llowlng butto sell most production in ^
a c c o u n S r h r T l ^ ^ c f n r 1” 5^  c j ^  customers
chased Canadian wheat i n o n ly  o i l or two of"th^’ e ™  31 C0Untrles P -
age accounted for by regular customer* H i *  & 1Ve years” Tke percent- 
production. Howev/r, fhe tendency to M  °f hlgh
limited by short-term inelasticif-?L a a P fc }l available supplies is 
stocks to guarantee supply to regular customers ^  malntaln efficient
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4.0. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN WHEAT EXPORT STRATEGY
The central concern of this study is the potential responsiveness of 
Canadian wheat exports to changes in world prices. This is a function of 
the export strategy of the Canadian Wheat Board, the relationship between 
world prices and Canadian producer prices, and the extent to which Canadian 
producers respond to changes in prices. These three aspects are analyzed 
empirically in this section of the study.
4.1. Estimation Results for Exports
If the Canadian Wheat Board were essentially playing a passive role 
in determining Canadian wheat exports, i.e., the Board acted simply as a 
market intermediary, then exports would be determined by the difference 
between production and domestic consumption, and stocks would not be used 
actively as a buffer. To examine this hypothesis, exports were plotted 
against exportable surplus, both in thousands of metric tons, for the 
period 1973/74 - 1984/85 (figure 4.1). If exports were simply determined 
by availability, all observations would lie along the 45-degree line. 
Observations below the 45-degree line represent stock accumulation (XSUR > 
EXPW) while those above indicate stock depletion. Figure 4.1 also plots 
exports and exportable surplus through time. In this diagram, stock accu­
mulation occurs in years when availability (XSUR) is greater than exports 
(EXPW), whereas the reverse indicates stock depletion. It is this pattern 
of accumulation and depletion which the naive model does not capture. 
These diagrams illustrate that a simple relationship between actual exports 
and exportable surplus does not exist.
In the model of excess demand for Canadian wheat in section 3, it was 
hypothesized that in the short run the Canadian Wheat Board determines 
exports primarily on the basis of the availability of markets. The CWB 
develops these markets based on its medium-term expectations of exportable 
surplus. High availability or weak demand causes stock accumulation, while 
low availability and/or strong demand causes stock depletion. Thus, the 
stock depletion in 1974 is explained by low production and the strength of 
the market. The stock accumulations of 1976 and 1978, and the associated 
depletions of 1977, 1979, and 1980, were the result of transportation and 
handling difficulties that limited exports and forced the CWB to restrict 
deliveries. Examination of the data indicates that the accumulations of 
1976 and 1978 were also associated with weak demand from Canada's regular 
customers. The modest quantities added to stocks in 1981 made it possible 
for exports to exceed the quantity available from current production in 
1984. The lack of significant accumulation in 1982 and 1983, despite high 
availability, is more difficult to explain since this was a period of weak­
ening prices and declining world imports of wheat.
Figure 4.1 also suggests the existence of heteroskedasticity in that 
the deviations of exports from the trend line increase for the last three 
observations. It is possible that in this period of large U.S. wheat sur­
pluses , the price support provided by the U.S. loan program and the related 
ability of other exporters to undersell the United States served to 
increase the short-term elasticity of demand for Canadian wheat. This 
would make it easier for the CWB to dispose of above-average supplies and
Fig
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to avoid storage. Alternatively, even if short-term demand remained 
inelastic, the CUB might have decided against storing wheat in a period of 
generally weak demand and excess supply. This last explanation seems the 
most likely.
To estimate the export model, a variable is needed to represent CUB 
expectations. These expectations are assumed to be captured by the follow­
ing trend in exportable surplus
(4.1) XSUR - -1,556,731 + 794.6 YEAR 
(t) (3.52) (3.55)
Rz = .53 d.w.= 1.66 n - 13
CUB expectations, PXSUR, are taken as the trend values from (4.1). 
Thus, the equation is interpreted to imply that the Wheat Board expects 
exportable surplus to increase by about 800 thousand metric tons each year. 
The large negative intercept results from the use of actual years (e.g., 
1973, 1974, etc.) in the regression, and the intercept is the meaningless 
extrapolation of the linear trend back to year zero.
The low proportion of total variation explained by this equation 
implies that expectations, formed on the basis of linear trend predict 
actual availability quite poorly. It is likely that, due to random varia­
tion in production, the CUB experiences difficulty in anticipating the size 
of exportable surplus. Thus, the model may reflect CUB expectations 
closely while lacking the ability to explain the actual variation in the 
quantity available for export.
This is not to suggest that a linear trend fully represents how the 
CWB forms its expectations. Equation (4.1) is the simplest of several for­
mulations which could have been used. The Wheat Board is hypothesized to 
set medium-term export targets based on medium-term expectations of 
exportable surplus. In forming such expectations, the CWB presumably uses 
previous years as a guide but also has access to current information on 
factors likely to affect future production. The use of a trend line esti­
mated from realized ex post production assumes that the CWB uses all the 
information available and correctly anticipates the trend. While this may 
seem a fairly restrictive assumption, the fact that a simple linear trend 
is used rather than a more complex functional form makes it more plausible. 
In fact, in 1976 the Wheat Board announced an export target for 1985 of 30 
million tons of grain, a figure which is consistent with the linear trend 
estimated. The Board actually reached this target in 1983/84. Even If the 
Board may not actually form its expectations on the basis of a linear 
trend, such a trend serves to capture Board estimates reasonably well ex 
post.
Based on the theoretical model developed in section 3, export behav­
ior is analyzed empirically as a function of CWB expectations of exportable 
surplus (PXSUR) and deviations of actual surplus from expectations 
(XSDV7679). The second variable is included because it is acknowledged 
that exports do vary with availability even if stocks are used as a buffer. 
A coefficient of one on XSDV7679 would indicate that each thousand metric 
ton change in availability results in a thousand metric ton change in 
exports, other things equal, and that stocks are not used as a buffer.
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Conversely, a coefficient of zero would Indicate that there is no response 
of exports to changes in availability, i.e., that exports are determined by 
trend and that the residual is absorbed completely by stocks.
The coefficient on FXSUR is expected to be one since this variable is 
simply the trend in exportable surplus and the expected net change in 
stocks is assumed to be zero. In other words, exports must keep pace with 
the trend in availability or else stocks will either accumulate or diminish 
persistently. The results obtained are as follows
(4.2) EXPW - -464 + 1.05 FXSUR + 0.64 XSDV7679 
(t) (0.25) (9.18) (4.12)
RZ - .93 d.w. - 2.70 n - 12
FXSUR represents CWB expectations of exportable surplus derived from 
the predicted values from equation (4.1). The variable XSDV7679 is 
XSURDEV, deviations of actual exportable surplus from CWB expectations, 
multiplied by D7679, a 0-1 variable that reflects binding transportation 
and handling constraints. D7679 equals 0 for 1976/77 - 1979/80, 0.5 for 
1980/81, and 1.0 otherwise. Even though the physical constraint was most 
limiting in 1978/79, the effect was also felt the next two years due to 
stocks that had previously been accumulated. Including XSDV7679 prevents 
the regression from using deviations to explain variation in exports during 
the years of the binding constraints and only partially in 1980/81. The 
explicit assumption is that the CWB was forced to use stocks as a buffer in 
this period and export only the amount it projected to be available. The 
structure of the model is assumed to be otherwise constant in that the co­
efficient for PXSUR applies to the entire period.
The estimation results provide empirical evidence to support the 
theoretical analysis of CWB export strategy given in section 3, The coef­
ficient on PXSUR is close to 1.0 as expected and is highly significant, 
which confirms the hypothesis that export growth has been keeping pace with 
the average increase in availability of 800 thousand rat per year. The 
coefficient for XSDV7679 is significantly different from zero, and indi­
cates that a change in availability of 1000 mt Is associated with a 640 mt 
change in exports, all other things equal, when handling constraints are 
nonbinding. The remaining 360 mt would be absorbed by stocks.
Based on the model described in section 3, one would also have 
expected that changes in demand from regular customers would affect 
exports, at least when handling constraints were nonbinding, but this is 
not substantiated by the regression results. The hypothesis was tested 
using the variable QWDM, which is total imports (from all suppliers) of 
eleven countries which purchased Canadian wheat consistently throughout the 
period, accounting for 80 percent of all Canadian exports. Because this 
variable has a significant upward trend, the trend was removed and the 
variables QMDV (deviations from trend) and QMDV7679 (QMDV multiplied by 
D7679) were tested in the export equation. The results are shown, in table 
4.1 as models (b) and (c). The results from equation (4.2) are provided as 
model (a) for comparison. In neither of the alternative equations is the 
demand from regular customers statistically significant. It is possible 
that when these customers reduce their total imports, they maintain Imports 
from Canada. This is particularly likely for the six of these countries
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Table 4.1. Regression results with Canadian wheat exports as dependent 
variable, various models, 1973/74 - 1984/85.*
Model Intercept PXSUR XSDV7679 B3 X3 d. w.
(a) -464
(0.25)
1.05
(9,18)
0.64 
(4.12)
2.70
(b) 125
(0.07)
1.01
(8.23)
0.78
(3.55)
-0.1 QMDV7679 
(0.88)
2.85
(c) -532
(0.28)
1.05
(8.71)
0.61
(3.27)
0.03 QMDV 
(0.36)
2.53
<d) -955
(0.45)
1.07
(8.50)
0.64
(3.93)
95.66 PWXI7679 
(0.50)
2.84
(e) -946
(0.45)
1.07
(8.53)
0.64
(3.93)
93.38 PWROTI7679
(0,50)
2.85
(f) -1068(0.28)
1.09
(4.30)
0.58
(1-73)
15.87 PDIFF7679 
(0.01)
2.48
(g) -912(0.44)
1.07
(8.63)
0.64
(3.92)
136.2 PWIPI7679 
(0.52)
2.85
00 -188(0.10)
1.02
(7.46)
0.64
(3.88)
36.2 INT7679 
(0.51)
2.88
(i) -561
(0.31)
1.03
(8.73)
0.65
(4.04)
0.06 LSTKS7679 
(0.81)
2,91
*t-ratios are given in parentheses
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which have long-term agreements with Canada and which account for about 60
percent of all Canadian wheat exports.
• A ” lat8d question is whether Canadian exports are price iresponslve
m  the short term, that is, whether the CWB draws down stocks to increase 
exports when prices are strong. This question is different from that 
relating to meeting the demand from regular customers because their demand 
will not necessarily be correlated with world prices. Events in other 
countries may dominate world prices which should affect the CWB's ability 
° “!?n  i ^ 11 t0 1"frequent customers without disrupting the market. Based
related toe7rics°s W°Uld eXp6Ct SUCh eXports to be Positively
T. Thlf hyP°thesis was tested using three different price variables
« X ? 7679V  £ . " ?  tr6 r ® " 88. annUai CWB exP°rt quotations for No. 1 CTOS
a P pri„Ce of U ‘S- No- 2 Dark Northern Spring(PWROTI7679) and the average March price of December wheat futures on the
(PDIFF7679r A H  thTrade’ March daSh price in the same market(PDIFF7679). All three variables are in Canadian dollars, deflated by pro­
ducer prices, and multiplied by the dummy variable D7679. As Table 4.1
indicates (models d, e, and f), none of the estimated coefficients for
these variables is significantly different from zero.
d- J ? \ laCk ° l eYidenoe in the present study for price response of Cana­
dian wheat exports is somewhat surprising. It suggests that, while the CWB 
accumulated some stocks in years of high production, it did not do so con
attanri y w en prices were weak. This could suggest that the CWB pays more
attention to market share considerations than anticipated by the theoreti­
cal analysis m  section 3, since a lack of price response implies less
variable exports, other things constant '
tb„ f„Ihe m°del deVeloped SeCtiDn 3  focused on the issues discussed in 
7 egoing paragraphs, but the model does not preclude the possibility
beaL  t6" ?a°tC7  af/ 6Ct C™  6Xport bebavior. For example, exports might
- r 1!?1" related t 0  the CHB'S inltial Payments since higher payments (which serve as guaranteed minimum prices) could reduce the CWB's flexi­
bility to reduce prices in order to increase exports. Alternatively 
exports may be negatively related to the Wheat Board's cost of capital’ 
since the CWB may be less willing to hold stocks when interest rates are 
high Yet another hypothesis is that exports are affected positively by 
the level, of carry- m  stocks, based on the assumption that large carry-in 
would make the CWB reluctant to store additional grain. y
„ Testing these hypotheses should reduce the likelihood of bias due to
iT CraTnifiaT' “ * fh° ™  in Table 4 ‘1 (®°<iels g, h, and
2.' ri Vi . 1 .pa^ ® nts> deflated fey producer prices, were found to fee 
statistically insignificant as an explanatory variable, as were interest
rfteS ^ d. Carry‘in stocks- These results support the conclusions reached 
above that exports are mainly a function of the expected exportable surplus 
and respond only partially to short-term variations around expected levels
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4.2. Acreage Response
The second major aspect of Canadian wheat 
this study is the supply (acreage) equation, 
issues in the specification of this equation is 
which producers respond.
Spriggs concluded that, even though returns to wheat consist largely 
of payments from the Canadian Wheat Board, offboard prices more closely 
reflect the "supply-inducing price" and are a more appropriate, explanatory 
variable in the supply equation than CWB payments. He argues that the off- 
board price reflects the expected value of returns from the CWB except when 
the CWB restricts deliveries to elevators. In this case, the diversion of 
additional supplies to the offboard market will depress prices in that mar­
ket below expected returns from sales to the CWB. As a result, the off­
board price is even more appropriate as the supply-indueing price because 
the CWB price becomes irrelevant in marginal production decisions.
Glenn and Lattimore use the farm price of wheat (apparently equiva­
lent to the offboard price) , but go one step further by adjusting this 
price by average storage costs of on-farm stocks (per ton of marketed 
wheat). This adjustment incorporates the possibility that farmers may not 
be able to deliver to the CWB all that is produced in a given year.
Several other studies have used combinations of CWB payments 
(initial, final, and total) as explanatory variables in acreage response 
models (MeiIke; MacLaren; Lowe and Petrie; and Koo). These specifications 
are interesting because it would be useful to know how wheat area responds 
to announced government prices, but there are complications, Final pay­
ments are announced sometimes 2 years after the initial payment, i,e., well 
after planting decisions are made for the next crop. To use only the ini­
tial payment assumes that producers have no information as to whether 
future final payments will be above or below the historical average, while 
to include those future final payments is to assume perfect expectations. 
If the most recent previous final payment is included, this assumes naive 
expectations.
None of these assumptions is very realistic. Furthermore, since not 
all wheat is deliverable to the CWB, Board payments can become irrelevant 
for marginal supplies. Consequently, the offboard price is chosen as the 
supply-inducing price in this study. While offboard price is probably the 
best indication of marginal returns in the previous year, carry-in stocks 
represent information on the likelihood that prices in the current year 
will be depressed by restrictive quotas. For this reason, lagged ending 
stocks are also included as a separate variable in the model.
In estimating the acreage response equation, Spriggs' model was taken 
as a starting point. Spriggs explained acreage in terms of average returns 
to wheat, barley and rapeseed, calculated as price weighted by a three-year 
moving average of yields; a zero-one variable to reflect the impact of the 
LIFT program in 1970/71; and a further qualitative variable to reflect 
structural change from monocropping in the 1960s to diversified farming in 
the 1970s. In the present model, the weighting of prices by average yields 
is dropped, crop prices are deflated by an input price index, and lagged
response to be analyzed in 
One of the most important 
the choice of the price to
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stocks are added. Each of these changes is discussed below. Two alterna­
tive equations are estimated: the first assumes that producers base their 
decisions primarily on prices lagged one period (model 1); the second 
assumes a lag in adjustment in the form of a partial adjustment model 
(model 2). The partial adjustment framework has been used by MeiIke, Glenn 
and Lattimore, and Koo. The estimated equations are
(4.3) AW = -443,882 +25.6 PUFI-1 - 30.6 PBFI-1 - 3.61 FRAPEI-1
(t) (8.12) (3.63) (3.74) (3.56)
- 0.18 OFSW-1 - 2236 LIFT + 3670 STRUCT + 231 YEAR
(6.62) (6.46) (10.31) (8.49)
Rz(adj) = .98 d.w. - 3.14 n«20 (1964/65- 1983/84)
(4.4) AW - 10,702 + 32.5 PWF-1 - 41.5 PBF-1 - 4.35 PRAFEI-1
(t) (9.08) (2.63) (2.96) (2.43)
- 3559 LIFT -f- 409 STRUCT -■ 0.23 OFSW-1 + 0.32 AW-1
(5.78) (1.44) (5.13) (3.83)
Rzadj - .95 n—20 (1964/65 - 1983/84)
where: AW ™ Canadian area planted to wheat in thousands if hectares:
FWFI-1 = offboard price of wheat, previous year, deflated by 
producer price index, $C/mt;
PBFI-1 - offboard price of barley, previous year, deflated, $C/mt;
FRAPEI-1 - price of rapeseed, Winnipeg exchange, previous year,
$C/mt;
OFSW-1 - ending on-farm stocks of wheat, previous year, mmt;
LIFT == 0/1 variable for the acreage reduction program equal to 1 
in 1970/71 and 0 otherwise;
STRUCT = 0-1 variable for structural change from monocropping of
1960s to diversified farming of the 1970s, equal to 1 for 
1963/64 to 1968/69, 0.5 in 1969/70, and 0 thereafter; and 
YEAR - trend variable in years (e.g., 1978).
The variables AW, LIFT, and STRUCT are as used by Spriggs. The esti­
mated coefficients for the prices of wheat, barley, and rapeseed (deflated 
and lagged) all have the expected signs, as does OFSW. All other variables 
have large t-ratios as well as expected signs. The LIFT variable reflects 
the impact of this program upon planted acreage. While this effect was 
short-lived, there was also longer-term change resulting from the change 
from monocropping to diversified farming. This is captured by the STRUCT 
variable. One of the objectives of the LIFT program was to encourage 
diversification away from wheat and, as C. Wilson notes, barley production 
has increased substantially since. In fact, the diversification appears to 
have begun the year before, in 1969/70, and included other crops as well, 
especially rapeseed. Both the acreage data and the precision of the esti­
mated coefficient are suggestive of its Impact.
The LIFT program is estimated to have caused a reduction of over 2 
million hectares in wheat area, again similar to Spriggsf estimate. To the 
extent that the LIFT program hastened the process of crop diversification 
as captured in the variable STRUCT, it may be inferred that the program was 
associated with an additional reduction of 3.7 million hectares, since this
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is the first year that diversification is assumed to have taken full 
effect.
Already discussed above is the question of the form the price varia­
bles should take. While Spriggs' use of returns (price times a moving 
average of yield) is appealing because it accounts for differential changes 
in productivity over time, estimation revealed that deflated prices perform 
better than deflated returns. Furthermore, inspection of the data indi­
cates that no major shifts in relative crop yields have taken place in the 
last twenty years. Using returns instead of prices seems an unnecessary 
and unproductive complication.
A related issue is how to account for the income insurance effects of 
the Western Grain Stabilization Program (WGSP) on supply. It is inappro­
priate to add an estimate of a deficiency payment to crop prices, because 
the WGSP makes payments based on shortfalls in farmers' total revenue. 
While farmers may be able to attribute approximate portions of their pay­
ments to low prices for certain crops, this is difficult to model. A 
variable (WGSPAY) was defined as the total payout by the WGSP on an annual 
basis. (Started in 1976, the program made only two payouts, In 1977 and 
1978, during the period of this study.) This variable, deflated and lagged 
to be consistent with the other "price" variables, was tested as an ex­
planatory variable in the equations.
If the effect of the payments were straightforward, one would expect 
a positive coefficient, i.e., higher payouts should temper the acreage 
reduction effects of lower prices. The estimated coefficient, however, was 
negative and of low precision. Apparently, the fact that payouts are cor­
related with low prices (and low acreage) overwhelms any possible positive 
contribution. Or perhaps two nonzero data points are insufficient to 
establish the expected relationship. As the program continues, It Is pos­
sible that a longer data series could be shown to have an effect, but for 
the time being the variable must be excluded.
A related issue is the possible effect of the changing structure of 
Canadian rail rates on wheat acreage. In a recent pamphlet, Transport 
Canada (no date) projected that rail rates for wheat shipment will increase 
from $4.89/mt in 1982/83 to $24.69/mt by 1991/92 as a result of the Western 
Grain Transportation Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1984. Under 
the act, rapeseed meal and oil and various other commodities became eligi­
ble for’ the current subsidized rates for the first time and, henceforth, 
cost increases will affect equally the prices of these commodities and 
grain prices. If the benefits of these transport subsidies for rapeseed 
were passed along to producers, one would expect this to change relative 
returns from wheat and rapeseed and to have reduced wheat acreage in 1984.
In fact, the area planted to wheat did decline substantially that 
year, for only the second time in a decade, while the area planted to rape- 
seed' increased. But because rapeseed products and other "specialty crops" 
which provide cropping alternatives to wheat producers have now been 
included in the statutory rate structure, increasing rail^  rates over the 
next decade can be expected to have little effect on relative returns. As 
a result of higher transport costs for wheat, there may be more cattle 
feeding ip western Canada (Norraile, 1984). Grain prices will be lower and
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farmers may grow more barley and less wheat for feed purposes. Lower grain 
prices-■can also be expected to force some marginal areas out of production 
if "these can no longer cover variable costs. However, it is unlikely that 
the-modest reduction in price due to changes in transport costs will -be a 
major- "factor influencing wheat-acreage.
Estimated price elasticities from the two equations- and from other 
studies-are -presented in table 4.2. Because yield is exogenous, supply 
elasticities can be assumed to be identical to acreage elasticities in the 
medium term. When used to project changes in supply, however, these esti­
mates will be less reliable than for acreage because of random variation in 
yields-;- The estimated elasticities for the price variables derived from 
model 1 are close to those of Spriggs, despite the fact that Spriggs used 
undeflated returns. This model implies that wheat area is increasing by 
230 thousand hectares every year, other factors held constant. The trend 
effect ■Is ■ large relative to the price effect.
The elasticity estimates derived from model 2 are all substantially 
higher than' those - in • model 1, at least in the long run. As may ■ be ob­
served, there are no compelling statistical criteria which might be used to 
choose between equations (4.3) and (4.4); however, the decision to include 
or exclude a trend or a lagged response clearly produces different results. 
If the model assumes a lagged response as in equation (4.4), the implied 
long-run elasticities are nearly twice as large as the elasticities in 
equation (4.3). However, the difference in the - combined own and cross- 
effects of equal price changes for wheat and barley is negligible between 
the models.- The prices of wheat and barley have historically been highly 
correlated (r-.98 for the current sample period). With respect to a major 
concern of this study, the effect of lower U.S. and world prices on Cana­
dian exports, this is a significant conclusion. The 1985 U. S. Food Secu­
rity Act lowered loan rates for both wheat and feed grains, and movements 
in the two prices can be expected to be highly correlated at least in the 
medium term. Consequently, the choice between the two models is not as 
critical as it may at first appear.
4 i-3 , Wheat Price; Transmission .
The final aspect of the Canadian response to be analyzed is the rela­
tionship between world and domestic prices. If Canadian wheat farmers use 
the offboard price for planning purposes, then it is necessary to know to 
what extent changes in U . S. prices affect the offboard price in order to 
assess the likely impact of lower U.S. prices.
Spriggs estimated a price transmission equation for Canada between 
the offboard price of wheat and the Canadian Wheat Board's export 
("asking-V) prices. The present study diverges from that of Spriggs in two 
important respects. The first is in the choice of the variable to repre­
sent world price. CWB export price quotations are unsatisfactory because 
these-':quo-tes are only asking ..prices. Since the mid-1970s, the CWB has sold: 
large-quantities of wheat at prices below its official quotations in order 
to meet the prices of other suppliers (Oleson). Furthermore, using the CWB 
quotations does not shed much light on the transmission of price from the 
world to1 the Canadian domestic market. Since the focus of this study is
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Table 4.2. Estimated acreage elasticities from this and other studies
Wheat
Prices
Barley Rapeseed
On-farm 
wheat stocks
This studv
Model 1 (means) .42 -.41 - .15 - .oy
(1983 prices) .24 -.19 -.08 - .03
Model 2 (means)
Short run .53 -.54 -.18 - .12
Long run .78 - .80 -.27 -.18
(1983 prices)
Short run .31 -.26 -.10 - .04
Long run . 46 -.39 -.15 -.06
Sprites (means) .43a -. 22a -. 13a
Glenn & Lattimore
Short run 
Long run
.53°
1.07b
-.26
-.53
a Price variables not deflated by input prices. 
b Average inventory costs subtracted from wheat price.
48
the effect of changes in U . S. export prices on Canadian exports, U. S.
export prices are used.
A second- difference in the current study is that the price transmis­
sion equation is estimated in log-log form instead of the linear form used 
by Spriggs. It would be appropriate to use the linear form (or some other 
form.-with nonconstant elasticities) if there were an indication of differ­
ential price transmission at different price levels. Such asymmetries 
would.: typically be caused by policy intervention. In the case of Canada, 
the Wheat Board's delivery quota system is a policy instrument that can 
affect price transmission. ■ It is hypothesized that when delivery quotas 
are restrictive, Canadian offboard prices will be depressed. .Otherwise, it 
is expected that the elasticity of price transmission would be constant, 
since GWB payments are determined by prices received in world markets and 
offboard prices should reflect the marginal value of deliveries to the CWB.
The restrictiveness of delivery quotas can be represented by the 
proxy variable used by both Meilke and Spriggs, defined as deliveries to 
the GWB divided by farm supply, This variable is only weakly correlated 
with U. S. export prices (r-0.33), so it is inappropriate to subsume its 
effect in a linear functional form in which elasticity varies with price 
but does not explicitly include the delivery quota effect. It is prefer­
able to include the proxy as an explanatory variable in a log-log model 
which assumes that the elasticity of price transmission is otherwise con­
stant . The results from estimating the log-log price transmission model 
are shown as equation (4.5) in table 4.3.
Because 21 years is a long period for which to assume that the struc­
ture of price transmission remained unchanged, the model was also estimated 
for two subperiods. The marketing year 1973/74 was taken as a likely point 
of change, because of the entry of the Soviet Union into the world wheat 
market. The results (table 4.3 equations (4.6) and (4.7)) do not support 
the hypothesis of structural change, The differences In the coefficients 
for the two subperiods are not statistically significant. Consequently, 
the results for the entire period (equation (4.5)) are used.
Equation (4.5) implies that a 1 percent change in the U. S. price (USPXGF) 
will be associated with a 0,95 percent change in the Canadian offboard 
price in the concurrent year. Hence, there is virtually complete price 
transmission with no lag. The one qualification is that when quotas are 
restrictive, transmission of world prices to the offboard market Is incom­
plete . The proxy variable for restrictiveness of delivery quotas, DQR, is 
at a minimum for the sample period in 1981/82 at 1.14, i. e . , farm supply 
was only slightly greater than deliveries to the Wheat Board. This can be 
taken as a standard for open quotas, since some wheat is sold on the off- 
board market and farmers prefer to carry over some wheat to the next year.
The implications of the coefficient for DQR are clearer if predicted
values for PWF are recalculated using equation (4.5), based on the assump­
tion of open quotas. For instance, from this equation the predicted off- 
board price for 1978/79. at the height of Canada's transportation difficul- 
ties, is. $86/mt. However, if one- assumes "open” quotas and substitutes. 
DQR=1.14 for the actual value of DQR(1978)=2.39, the predicted value of PWF 
is $120/mfc. For 1982/83 it is estimated that quotas depressed prices' from
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Table 4.3. Regression coefficients for price transmission equations 
(dependent variable is PWF)
Explanatory variables R2 Equation
Period CONSTANT InUSPXGF InDQR (adj) number
1963/64 - 1983/84 -0.042
<t)
[s.e.]
0.954
(0.25)
[0.17]
-0.459
(29.17)
[0.03]
.98
(6.63)
[0.07]
(4.5)
1963/64 - 1972/73 -0.366
(t)
[s.e.]
1.043
(0.32)
[1.14]
-0.565
(3.97)
[0.26]
.88
(5.58)
[0.10]
(4.6)
1973/74 - 1983/84 0.406
(t)
[s.e.]
0.862
(0.71)
[0.58]
-0.364
(7.96)
[0.11]
.91
(3.93)
[0.09]
(4.7)
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$150/mt to $139/mt, and for 1983/84 from $155 to $151/mt. Again, these are 
maximum differences, since farmers may have voluntarily stored or sold more 
wheat on the offboard market in any given year, i.e., 1981/82 cannot be 
taken as an absolute standard. During the period 1981/82 to 1983/84, 
quotas were more open than in any other period in the previous two decades, 
which implies that world prices at that time were being transmitted to 
Canadian producers with little or no interference.
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5.0. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A major focus of this study is the identification of those factors, 
Including policy decisions of the Canadian government and Wheat Board, 
which influenced Canadian wheat exports in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Analysis of these factors is vital in assessing how Canadian wheat exports 
are likely to respond to U.S. policy initiatives. Of particular Interest 
is the question of how Canadian wheat production and exports are likely to 
respond to lower export prices for wheat from the United States.
The Canadian Wheat Board's primary objective apparently is to maxi­
mize returns for each year's crop while keeping stocks to a minimum. The 
CWB does not try to influence production but simply markets the grain pro­
duced. Domestic use is relatively stable and also largely free of policy 
intervention. Thus, over the medium term, a change in production is the 
most important single factor affecting exports.
Because neither the CWB nor the Canadian government has attempted to 
influence production levels, it follows that CWB decisions have had only a 
marginal impact on Canadian wheat exports. An exception to this generali­
zation is the delay by the Canadian authorities in licensing varieties of 
medium-quality wheat. Furthermore, the CWB's delivery quota system has 
been used in the past to restrict deliveries and, therefore, production. 
It could also be used in this way in the future, particularly for the 
newly-licensed, medium-quality varieties.
Although production is the major force behind the rising trend of 
Canadian exports, year-to-year changes are not due solely to fluctuations 
in output. Annual exports are determined in part by the demand from 
Canada's regular customers and the Wheat Board's desire to avoid selling at 
depressed prices or provoking retaliatory price-cutting by the United 
States.
A central component of the model of export demand for Canadian wheat 
discussed in this study is the hypothesis that short-term demand is inelas­
tic due to the reluctance of importers to switch suppliers or types of 
wheat. This implies that if the CWB tries to export more than its regular 
customers wish to buy, substantial price discounts would be necessary. In 
years when production is high and/or demand is weak, the CWB is compelled 
to store some of the excess wheat to avoid disrupting the market and pro­
voking U.S. retaliation or to avoid selling at unacceptably low prices. 
Stored grain is subsequently sold in years of low production and/or strong 
demand.
These market conditions have led the CWB to rely on long-term agree­
ments to provide regular buyers for Canadian wheat. Faced with increasing 
Canadian production, the CWB attempts to expand Its sales to regular cus­
tomers in line with the production trend. But regardless of the CWB's suc­
cess in developing regular markets, it must on average sell the available 
quantity of exportable surplus in order to avoid accumulating stocks.
During the latter half of the 1970s, transportation and handling dif­
ficulties constrained the CWB to export no more than about 16 mint of wheat 
each year. When exportable surplus exceeded this level, the CWB was forced
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to store the excess. In addition, in 1976/77 and 1978/79, weak demand from 
Canada's regular customers prevented Canada from exporting up to the 
handling constraint, necessitating additional stock accumulation. By 
1981/82, transportion constraints were no longer binding and all stocks 
accumulated in the latter half of the 1970s had been sold. Physical con­
straints no longer restrict sales and, consequently, exports in recent 
years have been linked more closely with availability. However, short-term 
inelasticities of demand may discourage the CWB from selling all its ex­
portable surplus each year. As a result, the CWB may continue to use 
stocks as a partial buffer.
Canadian exports do not appear to be responsive to world prices in 
the short term. Exports appear to respond to prices only as a result of 
changes in production and export availability. One possible explanation is 
that with persistent U.S. surpluses depressing world wheat prices, the CWB 
has become more reluctant to accumulate stocks when demand is weak. It is 
risky to hold stocks in the expectation of an improvement in world prices. 
As a result, the CWB seems to have been more willing in recent years to 
iscount wheat in order to dispose of the current year's crop Another 
possible explanation for the reluctance to hold stocks is the desire to 
maintain or increase market share.
In summary, the annual level of Canadian wheat exports is determined 
the amount tiie fcat Board expects to have available and ' for 
which it has developed regular customers. In years when production is 
above average or demand is below average, the Board stores grain to avoid 
selling at depressed prices and disrupting the market. This grain is dis- 
p°se? when market conditions are more favorable. In the latter half of 
the 1970s, the CWB followed this strategy quite closely, storing grain when 
production was high and/or demand was weak. In the early 1980s, exports 
were more closely related, to annual availability.
Although Canadian exports demonstrate no significant responsiveness 
to price in the short run,, estimation of the price transmission equation 
indicates that U.S. wheat export prices are quickly reflected in the Cana­
dian offboard price of wheat. A 1 percent change in the U.S. export price 
is associated with an estimated 0.95 percent change in the offboard price 
m  the current year, with no evidence of a lagged impact in subsequent 
years. The only obstacle to this essentially complete price transmission 
occurs when Wheat Board delivery quotas are restrictive. Quotas have been 
generally ^ restrictive since 1980. Because of this nearly complete price 
transmission, the major factor Influencing exports in the medium term and
beyond is the response of Canadian production to changes in U S and world- 
prices ,
Canadian wheat yield varies randomly with weather, but it is possible 
to identify several factors which influence planted acreage of wheat. 
These factors include Canadian offboard prices of wheat and alternative 
crops, ending on-farm stocks from the previous marketing year, trends in 
summer fallow and the presence or absence of an acreage reduction program 
Econometric estimation of a model of Canadian wheat acreage suggests the 
impact of lower prices on wheat production will be limited. Depending on 
the /model employed, the elasticity of planted wheat area with respect to 
offboard wheat price is estimated to be between 0.24 and 0.46, based on
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changes around prices prevailing in 1983/84. The elasticity of wheat 
acreage with respect to an equal percentage change in both wheat and barley 
prices is negligible. Since historically these prices have been highly 
correlated, this result has important implications for the potential 
response of Canadian wheat acreage to simultaneous reductions in world 
wheat and feed-grain prices.
By lowering the loan rate for wheat under the 1985 Food Security Act, 
the U . S. government hoped that its supplies would become more competitive 
in the world market and that the United States could regain some of the 
customers it lost in the preceding years. The Canadian Wheat Board, how­
ever , can be expected to match U , S. export prices to retain its regular 
customers. To the extent that former U.S. customers have now developed 
commercial relationships with Canada, there is no immediate reason why they 
would switch back to the United States as long as Canada offers competitive 
prices. While the U.S. legislation was still under consideration, the CWB 
noted that the U.S, plan to lower export prices is "based on the premise 
that sales of U.S. farm products, and U.S. market share, will then be 
increased substantially. However, Canada and other competing countries 
will have no choice but to follow suit, leaving prices lower and market 
shares unchanged" (CWB, 1985a). Market share is probably not important to 
the CWB for its own sake. Rather, market share is important because it 
reflects purchase commitments from regular customers which enhance the 
CWB' s ability to sell the Canadian crop without substantial price 
discounts.
The Wheat Board's capacity to retain its regular customers depends 
upon Canadian producers maintaining current levels of production. This 
seems quite likely since, as indicated previously, the response of Canadian 
wheat acreage to changes in price is limited, particularly as has been the 
case recently as the price of both food and feed grains are depressed. The 
empirical results presented above suggest that the effects of lower prices 
on Canadian exports are likely to be small, not because of policies of the 
Canadian government or the Wheat Board, but because farmers in Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Alberta have few alternatives to growing wheat.
This study has described how the nature of the world wheat market, 
dominated by the U.S. loan program, affects Canadian export strategies and 
how the Canadian wheat sector has responded to the world market. While it 
has been possible to identify the policies and strategies which the Cana­
dian Wheat Board has used in recent years, it is, of course, impossible to 
know whether these will continue or whether new elements will be added. 
Although the analysis has focused on only one of the other players in the 
international wheat market, it points to the critical importance of U.S. 
pricing policies. When world wheat supplies are abundant, as they have 
been in recent years, the level of the loan rate has a major effect upon 
the level of world wheat prices. Furthermore, it provides an important 
point of reference for the pricing and exporting strategies of U.S. com­
petitors. In this type of environment, the United States is likely to face 
a continuing problem of how to provide a measure of price and income sup­
port to domestic wheat producers without compromising its competitive posi­
tion in international markets.
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